Verbale Calipari - TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING

III. TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines TCPs, BPs, and training matters. It first
discusses the difference between a TCP and a BP. Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for the various units involved regarding TCPs and
BPs are assessed, and the Rhino Bus TTP is outlined. This is followed
by a review of the training on TCPs, BPs, weapons, and Rules of
Engagement (ROE) that the Soldiers manning BP 541 had received before
4 March 2005. The ROE that were in effect that night are explained.
The section concludes with findings and recommendations.

B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions

(U) Task Force 1-69 IN had received missions to establish TCPs and
blocking positions numerous times in the past. Although the terms are
used interchangeably (Annex 65C), there are subtle, but distinct,
differences in approach to establishing the two positions. (Annex
96C).

(S//NF) A traffic control point involves
(1) the stopping of a vehicle, (2) a search of that vehicle, and (3)
the authorized passage of the vehicle through the control point.
(Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C, 72C). TCPs can be of limited or extended
duration. (Annex 97C).

(S//NF) A blocking position, in contrast, does not involve the search
of a vehicle. Ideally, the underlying intent of a blocking position
involves no contact with a vehicle. In Iraq, the purpose of a BP is
twofold: (1) to prevent vehicles from gaining access to the protected
location, and (2) to prevent VBIEDs from getting close enough to kill
or injure Soldiers or civilians. Blocking positions are neither
intended nor designed to allow traffic to pass. The intent is to
achieve maximum standoff from approaching vehicles and force them to
turn around. (Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C). Blocking positions can be
temporary or for longer durations. (Annex 97C). As indicated to 1-69
IN during Relief in Place operations, patrols must be prepared to
execute hasty BPs when required.

C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005

(U) SOPs are designed to serve as guidelines for specific operations
and are not prescriptive in nature. They provide a baseline for
acceptable operations from which commanders can derive principles and
techniques and adapt them to their current mission. (Annexes 44C, 65C,
72C, 96C, 98C).
1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks (Army Field Manual
3-21.9, Chapter 7)

(U) Construction and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks are high
frequency tasks for an infantry company and subordinate elements when
they must establish area security during stabilization operations.
(Annex 5F).

(U) A checkpoint is a predetermined point used as a means of
controlling movement, such as a place where military police check
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, to enforce circulation measures and
other law, order, and regulations. (Annex 5F).

(U) A roadblock is used to limit the movement of vehicles along a
route or to close access to certain areas or roads. Checkpoints and
roadblocks can be either deliberate or hasty. The primary difference
is the extent of planning and preparation conducted by the
establishing force. (Annex 5F).

(U) Checkpoints and roadblocks may be established to:

1? (U) Check and/or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles in
and out of the controlled area.

2? (U) Deter illegal movement.

3? (U) Create an instant roadblock.

4? (U) Control movement into the area of operations or on a specific route.

5? (U) Prevent smuggling and contraband.

(Annex 5F).

(U) The layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and
roadblocks should reflect the considerations of Mission, Enemy,
Terrain, Troops Available ? Time, Civilians (METT-TC), especially the
time available for emplacing them. (Annex 5F). The following factors
should be considered in establishing a checkpoint or roadblock:

1? (U) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it is visible and
where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass without
being observed.

2? (U) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into
the search area.

? (U) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within
sight, to deter resistance to Soldiers
manning the checkpoint. It must be able to engage
vehicles attempting to break through or
bypass a checkpoint. (Annex 5F).

(U) Many items are used to reinforce a roadblock or a checkpoint.
These include: barrels filled with sand, water, or heavy concrete
blocks (emplaced to slow and canalize vehicles), concertina wire
(emplaced to control movement around the checkpoint), and signs
stating the speed limit into and out of the checkpoint (in both
English and the local language.) (Annex 5F).

2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP

(S//NF) In 3ID's published Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP),
there is a section directly addressing traffic control points. A TCP
is defined as a "Structured Engagement Area." The 3ID FSOP does not
include guidelines for positions with a blocking mission (i.e.,
blocking positions). (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The TCP SOP calls for an Alert Line, a Warning Line, a Stop
line, a Search Area, and an Overwatch Area. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The Search Area should be a well-lit checkpoint, provide
standoff from neighborhood structures, allow a sufficient area to
accommodate more than one search team, the establishment of warning
signs with sufficient distance for drivers to react, the use of
physical barriers to force vehicles to slow down, and other barriers
like tire poppers, to block movement of vehicles attempting to
continue through the search area. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The Warning Line and Alert Line should provide maximum
standoff for oncoming traffic. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) Soldiers should fire into engine blocks before engaging the
driver. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The equipment for a TCP includes warning signs, triangles,
sawhorses, traffic cones, and/or tire poppers. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) Minimum leader requirements for executing a TCP are listed as
(1) map reconnaissance, (2) mission briefing, (3) safety briefing, and
(4) back brief to the commander or designated representative. Position
selection considerations are not specifically addressed. (Annex 1F).

3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP

(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN's published Tactical Standing Operating
Procedures (TACSOP) addresses checkpoint operations. The TACSOP does
not provide guidance on blocking positions. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) A unit establishes checkpoints to control its area of
responsibility, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and contribute to
security of military units as well as the populace. They must be
established to ensure that the position cannot be bypassed. (Annex
2F).

(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN TACSOP distinguishes between vehicle checkpoints
(VCPs) and personnel checkpoints (PCPs). These are further divided
into three types: deliberate, hasty, and flying. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Deliberate checkpoints are permanent or semi-permanent. They
are used near operating bases or along Main Supply Routes (MSRs).
(Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Hasty checkpoints are planned in advance and will be
maintained for a set period of time of short duration. Hasty
checkpoints are frequently employed during the conduct of vehicle or
foot patrols. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Flying, or immediate, checkpoints are conducted when specific
intelligence indicates that a checkpoint will hinder the enemy's
freedom of movement at a specific time and place. They are conducted
immediately and often with little or no planning. (Annex 2F). Although
not a TCP mission, the mission given to 1-69 IN to block Route Irish
on 4 March 2005 fell into this category.

(S//NF) Vehicle checkpoints should consist of four zones: canalization
zone, turning or deceleration zone, search zone, and safe zone. (Annex
2F).

(S//NF) The canalization zone uses natural obstacles and/or artificial
obstacles to canalize the vehicles into the checkpoint. It usually
consists of disrupting or turning obstacles, such as serpentines and
other barrier systems. Warning signs should be placed at least 100
meters in front of the checkpoint. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The turning or deceleration zone forces vehicles to make a
rapid decision, i.e., decelerate, make slow hard turns, or maintain
speed and crash into obstacles. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The search zone is a relatively secure area where personnel
and vehicles are positively identified. (Annex 2F). (S//NF) The safe
zone is the assembly area for the checkpoint that allows personnel to
eat, sleep, and recover in relative security. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The use of radios or cell phones should be limited to
essential communications and/or entirely prohibited as their
transmissions may detonate any IEDs present. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The SOPs used by 2/10 MTN originated with the 1st Armored
Division, and then were adopted by the 1st Cavalry Division, and in
turn by 3ID. (Annexes 66C, 67C). It is noted that the SOP is not
prescriptive, i.e., there is no requirement for signs, only a
suggestion. (Annex 2F). Soldiers and leaders alike acknowledged using
this SOP as a reference for establishing blocking positions, adopting
certain procedures and equipment as required. (Annexes 65C, 66C, 98C).

4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN has its own Tactical Standard Operating Procedures
(TACSOP). It is a modified version of the 256th Brigade TACSOP.
(Annexes 72C, 98C, 3F). It addresses checkpoint operations, but not
blocking positions. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 3F). In addition, there are
checklists for equipment to be used at TCPs. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The TCPs described in the 1-69 TACSOP are of a more enduring
nature than those described in 2/10 MTN's TACSOP. Even hasty
checkpoints are more like 2/10 MTN's deliberate checkpoints. There is
no similar position as the flying or immediate TCP described by the
2/10 MTN SOP. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The Battle Drill for TCP occupation described in the 1-69 IN
TACSOP is the same as that found in 3ID's FSOP. (Annexes 1F, 3F).

(S//NF) The Battalion considers barriers as mandatory equipment for
blocking positions (Annexes 96C, 97C, 98C). These can be existing
barriers on site or other obstacles such as concertina wire. (Annexes
96C, 98C). The team at BP 541 considered the on-site Jersey barriers
as meeting this requirement. (Annexes 74C, 77C).

(S//NF) Signs are required for TCPs. (Annex 96C). Signs were not used
at BPs by 4-5 Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 1-69 IN's predecessor.
Based on their experience, the opinion of the BP 541 Soldiers was that
signs had been marginally effective for TCPs conducted in the daytime
in Taji. They were less effective at night. During both day and night
operations, the signs were easily bypassed. (Annexes 79C, 87C).

(S//NF) The Soldiers have found concertina wire to be effective at
TCPs in the daytime. Wire becomes quite ineffective at night as
motorists cannot see it, even when chemlights are attached to it.
Furthermore, the BP 541 Soldiers believed that the emplacement of
concertina wire exposes them to additional risk. (Annexes 79C, 87C).

(S//NF) The signs that A Company, 1-69 IN Soldiers had used in Taji
had not been available since their move to Baghdad on 5 February 2005.
(Annexes 81C, 112C). On or about 12 February 2005, the signs were
unloaded and stored next to a conex. There were approximately 25 signs
in this shipment. These were TCP signs that said "Stop and Wait to be
called forward." Other signs that had been for the rear of vehicles
said "Stay back 100 meters or you will be shot." The last part of that
phrase "or you will be shot" was to be covered with tape. (Annex
112C). The signs had not been modified, and, therefore, not reissued
as of 4 March 2005. (Annex 95C).

5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information

(U) Since October 2004, there had been significant insurgent contact
on Route Irish. Most of the contacts were RPGs, SAF, IEDs, and VBIEDs.
These attacks prompted a re-assessment of the Coalition's responses
for operations along Route Irish.

(S//NF) Route Irish is the primary route to BIAP for U.S. Embassy
personnel, and there was routinely at least one convoy each day. Rhino
buses (armored buses) were procured to provide better protection for
passengers. Additionally, a series of briefings and plans were
developed to address the insurgent situation along Route Irish. The
result was the Rhino Bus Run Program. (Annex 65C).

(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run Program, 1-76 FA escorts two or three
Rhino armored buses and one or two baggage trucks to and from the
Embassy staging area in the International Zone and the BIAP passenger
terminal twice nightly, seven days a week. Each run consists of up to
65 escorted passengers. This is the standard TTP 1-76 FA learned
during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program conducted by 2-82 FA as
part of Relief in Place operations. 1-76 FA's higher headquarters,
Fourth Brigade, coordinates attack helicopter support to conduct route
reconnaissance ahead of the convoy and Close Air Support in the event
of an attack. (Annex 59C).

(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run TTP, 1-76 FA identifies the escort
platoon. Once the escort platoon leader receives the number of
passengers for transport at the staging area, and has established
communications with the attack helicopters, the 1-76 FA TOC requests
clearance from the 3ID TOC (the battlespace owner) through 4th Brigade
TOC to move the convoy. Once 4th Brigade receives clearance from 3ID
TOC, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain contacts 1-69 IN Battle Captain and
requests that they establish blocking positions along Route Irish.
Once the 1-69 IN Battle Captain notifies the 1-76 FA Battle Captain
that the units are set in position, the convoys depart from the
staging area. Once the convoy has passed ECP 1, the 1-76 FA Battle
Captain contacts the 1-69 IN Battle Captain and clears the units to
open their blocking positions. The same process is followed for the
reverse trip. (Annex 59C).

(U) There is no written SOP that covers Rhino Bus operations. The TTPs
that 1-76 FA used on 4 March 2005 are the same TTPs employed by 2-82
FA. (Annex 59C).

D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers

(U) The Soldiers manning BP 541 on 4 March 2005 received SOP training
on TCPs at Fort Hood and the National Training Center (NTC). (Annexes
72C, 96C, 97C, 98C). The training at Fort Hood was part of
mobilization training, and was conducted by the Battalion leadership
and the Mobilization Assistance Team, while the training at NTC
occurred as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. (Annex 96C).

(S//NF) The Soldiers were trained to the following standards for TCPs:
(1) 360 degree security, (2) one element controls traffic entry to the
TCP, and (3) one element conducts searches and operates the detainee
holding area. Soldiers are to control traffic effectively and
efficiently, keep Soldiers safe, and accomplish the mission. (Annex
96C).

(S//NF) The Battalion Commander gave verbal guidance at Fort Hood on
using M4s as the primary weapon for firing warning shots. This was
intended for mounted mobile operations as a TTP for clearing overhead
passes instead of static blocking positions due to difficulty in
traversing the gunner's turret. (Annex 73C).

(S//NF) There is no evidence to indicate that the Soldiers were
trained to execute blocking positions before arriving in theater. TTPs
for blocking positions and other operations were learned and practiced
during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride exercises as part of the Relief
in Place/Transfer of Authority process with the Soldiers of 4-5 ADA
from 5 to 15 February 2005. Gunners and leaders were able to watch
tasks being performed before they had to perform these tasks
themselves under the supervision of 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C,
98C, 9G). These TTPs were accepted by the 1-69 IN Battalion Commander
as approved higher headquarters sanctioned guidance. (Annex 72C).

(S//NF) The 4-5 ADA blocking position TTP called for one vehicle,
either a HMMWV or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to pull up next to the
last Jersey barrier (closest to Route Irish). The Soldiers at the BP
would then use a hand-held spotlight and laser pointer to get drivers'
attention, and make them stop and turn around. Normally, these
blocking positions, which were hasty in nature, would be held for
10-15 minutes before the TOC would order the road opened. Signs were
not used by 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 74C, 83C).

(S//NF) As demonstrated by 4-5 ADA previously, the standard practice
by Alpha Company, 1-69 IN personnel at blocking positions is for the
gunner to use the spotlight, while the HMMWV commander or Truck
Commander operates the laser pointer. If the gunner must fire his
weapon, M4 or M240B, he drops the hand-held light to engage the threat
with well-aimed fire using both hands. (Annexes 74C, 79C). There is no
specific training for operating the spotlight and the M240B
simultaneously. (Annex 66C).

(U) Based upon the fact that two 1-69 IN Soldiers were killed by an
IED two nights before at Checkpoint 543, his experience, training, and
risk assessment, the Alpha Company Commander chose to augment the 4-5
ADA TTP on 4 March 2005 by placing two HMMWVs at BP 541 for additional
force protection. Force protection was paramount in his mind because
of the threat of IEDs and VBIEDs. (Annex 74C). As a result, Second
Lieutenant Acosta tasked the overwatch vehicle gunner to operate the
green laser pointer rather than have Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck
Commander do so. (Annexes 77C, 87C).

E. (U) Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers

(U) The Soldiers were trained on ROE as part of their deployment
preparation at Fort Hood and the National Training Center (NTC), as
well as in Kuwait and Iraq. (Annexes 111C, 128C, 134C). The training
at Fort Hood and NTC centered on basic ROE concepts of the escalation
of force, hostile intent, hostile act, and positive identification.
Specifically, Soldiers were briefed on the right of self defense,
which allows them to defend themselves and Coalition Forces with all
necessary force to negate the potential threat. Soldiers also received
training in graduated force, which is designed to allow them to employ
escalating measures of non-lethal force to properly discern hostile
intent and prevent accidental civilian injury. Soldiers were briefed
on positive identification (PID), which requires Soldiers to have a
reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a proper military
target. Soldiers were also briefed on the protections afforded
detainees and civilians, their duty to care for the wounded and sick,
military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and collateral
damage1. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 3G).

(U) While at NTC, judge advocates from the Center for Law and Military
Operations (CLAMO) conducted impromptu interviews with the Soldiers,
including Soldiers from 1-69 IN, where they were questioned about
basic ROE principles. ROE is a key aspect of training at NTC and
Soldiers are challenged with difficult, real world scenarios that
emphasize ROE issues, such as, the use of force and properly
identifying hostile intent. (Annexes 111C, 1G).

(U) The Soldiers of the BP 541 team had received formal refresher ROE
training approximately one month before the incident. (Annexes 129C,
132C, 133C, 137C). This training included vignettes on TCP operations,
fixed site security, and patrols, and emphasized the use of graduated
force and how and when to use non-lethal measures of force.
Specifically, the vignettes highlighted how to discern hostile act and
hostile intent from innocuous civilian activity. (Annexes 111C, 1G).

(U) The entire battalion, including every member of the BP 541 team,
received an in-depth review of a recent AR 15-6 investigation
involving a shooting incident that further reinforced proper execution
of ROE. (Annex 133C). The investigation involved the wounding of a
civilian at a TCP, in which the vehicle was driving at a high rate of
speed and the Soldiers at the TCP engaged the vehicle. The brief
discussed the use of signs, chemical lights, spotlights, and graduated
force as it applies to fixed position operations. Failure to follow
the SOP was discussed and how proper use of the SOP can help a Soldier
to discern hostile intent. Escalation of force to discern hostile
intent was emphasized. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 2G, 3G).

(U) Furthermore, the Soldiers were briefed on ROE before going out on
patrol each day. They were so briefed on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 83C,
129C, 130C, 132C, 134C, 135C).

19 (S//NF) 1 Military necessity requires that all targets are proper
military targets, i.e., they possess a military attribute, the
destruction of which provides a military advantage. Proportionality
refers to whether any expected collateral damage is excessive in
comparison to the overall military value of the target. Discrimination
requires Soldiers to employ force in a manner that properly
distinguishes between lawful targets and unlawful targets. Collateral
damage encompasses any death or injury to civilians and damage or
destruction of civilian property.

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines a Hostile Act as "a use of
force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons or property under
the protection of 1-69 IN forces that is likely to cause serious
permanent injury or death or significant property damage." (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines Hostile Intent as "a threat of
imminent use of force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons
or property under the protection of MNC-I forces that is likely to
cause serious permanent injury or death or significant property
damage. Hostile intent may be judged by the threatening force or
individual's capability and preparedness to inflict damage, or by
evidence, particularly intelligence, that clearly indicates that a
surprise strike is imminent." (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE allows the use of deadly force if a
Soldier, his unit, other U.S. forces, or designated friendly forces
are attacked or threatened with imminent attack. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The ROE taught to the Soldiers was shout, show, shove, shoot.
(Annexes 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE also
provides for shout, show, shove, shoot. (Annex 3F). For the night of 4
March 2005 at BP 541, the Soldiers were told the ROE was: Shout, i.e.,
use the spotlight on an approaching vehicle as far in advance of the
Alert Line as possible; Show, i.e., use the green laser light, aimed
at the driver, at the Alert Line; Shove, i.e., fire warning shots; and
Shoot, i.e., disabling shots first, then, if necessary, shoot to kill.
(Annexes 77C, 81C).

F. (U) Findings

(U) The leaders and Soldiers understood their mission to block vehicle
access to Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005. They were
knowledgeable of the Rules of Engagement to be employed in that
mission. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C).

(U) The Soldiers at BP 541 had been trained, and routinely refreshed
on, the Rules of Engagement since their arrival in theater. (Annexes
77C, 81C, 111C).

(U) There is no written SOP or TTP in 3ID, 2/10 MTN, or 1-69 IN for
the execution of the blocking mission and establishing a blocking
position. (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F). The procedure was passed on from the
departing unit (4-5 ADA) to the incoming unit (1-69 IN) during the
Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, where leaders observed the
execution of the mission one week, and executed the mission the
following week under the supervision of the outgoing unit (Right
Seat/Left Side Ride). The only training received by 1-69 IN Soldiers
on blocking positions was that employed along Route Irish during
after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred during the Left Seat Right
Seat Ride process with 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It
is clear that these BPs were not established as TCPs.

(U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is
required for establishing a blocking position (e.g., different road
signs). (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).

(U) Requiring the gunner in a blocking position to operate the
hand-held spotlight as well as his crew-served weapon is an accepted
practice in 1-69 IN. (Annexes 72C, 74C).

G. (U) Recommendations

(U) Recommend that all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) review the
inherent differences between the blocking mission and any other
mission involving TCPs. Given the nature of the environment in Iraq,
recommend that blocking positions be addressed separately in unit
SOPs.

1? (S//NF) Soldiers and leaders must understand that in a BP, the goal
is to achieve standoff as far away and as quickly as possible, with no
vehicle passage.

(U) Recommend a comprehensive review of TCP and blocking position
procedures, to include risk assessment, required equipment,
considerations for site selection, and the establishment of clearly
visible warnings or indicators, both day and night, for Soldier and
civilian recognition. The Soldiers and leaders must look at the
position holistically, i.e., from the perspective of Iraqi drivers and
what they might see. Units must enforce a quality control program to
maintain established standards.

(U) As of this writing, MNC-I has already embarked on a comprehensive
analysis of Entry Control Points (ECPs), TCPs, and BPs.

1? (S//NF) This analysis will produce standard practices and
guidelines for the selection and establishment of ECPs, TCPs, and BPs.

(U) Recommend that permanent Coalition participation be included in
the Force Protection Working Group to solicit lessons learned from
other nations' experiences in operating ECPs, TCPs, and BPs in an
insurgency environment. (U) Recommend the development and publication
of a written SOP for Rhino Bus Runs.