Verbale Calipari - COORDINATION

V. COORDINATION

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section addresses the status of coordination with MNF-I,
MNC-I, and their subordinate units regarding the recovery and
transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. Further, it examines the role
that Captain Green played in this incident.

B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement

(U) When moving through another unit's battlespace in a combat zone,
coordination with forces in the area is required for situational
awareness, and, more importantly, for deconfliction of unit movements,
positioning, and operations. For example, 2/10 MTN has successfully
coordinated and executed previous movements and operations of units
and forces not assigned to their AOR. The unit had coordinated,
sometimes on relatively short notice, with numerous Joint Special
Operations Units, Special Missions Units, and Special Tactics Units
before 4 March 2005, with no incidents. (Annex 65C).

(U) To determine who or what organizations were aware of the Sgrena
recovery and transport operation, sworn statements were taken from key
military officials within MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units
that, by their function, would have had access to information about
such an operation. A statement was also provided by the Political
Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The results are listed
below:

1? (U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the Political Military
Counselor, knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting
incident had occurred. (Annex 114C).

2? (U) No one within the MNF-I leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 1C
to 27C).

3? (U) No one, with one exception to be addressed below, within the
MNC-I leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the
shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 28C to 43C).

4? (U) No one within the 3ID leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 44C
to 56C).

5? (U) No one within 4 BCT knew about the Sgrena operation until after
the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 5M).

6? (U) No one within the 1-76 FA leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 58C
to 63C).

1? (U) No one within the 2/10 MTN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 65C
to 71C).

2? (U) No one within the 1-69 IN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes
72C, 96C to 99C).

3? (U) No one at the BIAP Command Post knew about the Sgrena operation
until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 110C).

4? (U) No one at the Hostage Working Group knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex
126C).

5? (U) No one with A Company, 1-69 IN knew about the Sgrena operation
until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 76C, 78C,
80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C).

(U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was
totally unaware of the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March
2005 until after the shooting incident had occurred.

C. (U) Captain Green

(U) Captain Green (USA) is the Aide-de-Camp to Major General Mario
Marioli (ITAR), DCG, MNC-I. (Annex 107C). As early as 28 February
2005, Captain Green was aware that a number of Italian VIPs would be
coming into BIAP. The date for their arrival kept getting pushed back.
He was aware that the VIPs would be involved in working the Sgrena
hostage situation. Captain Green knew no specifics beyond that.
(Annexes 107C, 109C).

(U) At approximately 1330 hours on 4 March 2005, Captain Green,
Lieutenant Colonel Zarcone (ITAR), and one PSD departed for BIAP,
arriving at about 1350 hours. Major General Marioli and another PSD
arrived shortly thereafter. (Annex 107C). The plane finally arrived at
1626. (Annex 1H). Eleven passengers deplaned and were immediately
taken to the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory. There, security badges
were obtained for five of the VIPs. (Annexes 106C, 107C).

(U) Captain Green accompanied three Italian VIPs, Major General
Marioli, and two PSDs in three cars to a location about one kilometer
beyond Checkpoint 539 on Route Irish. Two Italians left, heading into
Baghdad. The rest of the group waited at the site for a short while,
returned to Camp Victory, then went back to the spot past Checkpoint
539. Major General Marioli did not want Captain Green to go back out
to Checkpoint 539, but Captain Green, as his aide, insisted since his
presence would be necessary to interface with the U.S. security forces
in the area. (Annexes 100C, 106C, 107C).

(U) At approximately 2030 hours, Major General Marioli approached
Captain Green and asked him how he was doing and if Lieutenant Colonel
Zarcone had told him what was going on. Captain Green said no, but
that he suspected it had something to do with the Italian journalist.
Major General Marioli said "Yes, but it is best if no one knows."
Captain Green took this as an order from a General Officer not to pass
that information on to anyone. (Annex 109C). Moreover, Major General
Marioli did not intend for Captain Green to take any action whatsoever
on that information. He only told Captain Green so that he would not
be surprised when Ms. Sgrena arrived. (Annex 100C).

(U) Approximately 20 minutes later, a phone call came in to the third
Italian VIP at the site near Checkpoint 539. The call brought news of
the shooting. Captain Green made contact with U.S. personnel in a
nearby Bradley Fighting Vehicle and confirmed the shooting. Captain
Green subsequently was able to speak with Captain Drew at BP 541.
Captain Green discussed the matter with Captain Drew and relayed to
Major General Marioli that it was best for them to return to Camp
Victory as the wounded were being transported to the Combat Support
Hospital in the International Zone. (Annex 107C). Major General
Marioli was very appreciative of Captain Green's coordination efforts
following the shooting. (Annex 100C).

(U) Captain Green was not informed of the recovery and transport of
Ms. Sgrena until a short time before the incident at BP 541 occurred.
(Annex 109C). He was not expected to take any action in the matter as
it was an Italian national issue, nor was he in a position of any
authority to do so. (Annex 100C). He was obeying an order from Major
General Marioli. (Annex 109C).

D. (U) Findings

(U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain
Green), or subordinate units were informed by the Government of Italy
of the hostage rescue mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes
1C to 56C, 58C to 63C, 65C to 72C, 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C,
90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C, 126C, 7M).

(U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on
the part of the Italians as they considered the hostage recovery an
Intelligence mission and a national issue. (Annex 100C).

(U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and
2/10 MTN working with organizations from various agencies outside
their chain of command, it is clear that, while the hostage recovery
operation may have otherwise been a success, prior coordination might
have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a hostile environment, i.e,
a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase
situational awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the
better it is for all involved. (Annex 65C)