Verbale Calipari - ATMOSPHERICS

II. ATMOSPHERICS

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines the local security situation as of 4 March
2005, known insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and
recent events occurring in the vicinity of Checkpoint 541. The
previous experience of the Soldiers manning the BP that night, their
parent unit, and their higher headquarters units in the Baghdad Area
of Responsibility (AOR), is also examined. The purpose of this section
is to present a full picture of the conditions facing the Soldiers
manning BP 541 that night.

B. (U) Local Security Situation

1. (U) Iraq. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were 15,257
attacks against Coalition Forces throughout Iraq. The U.S. considers
all of Iraq a combat zone. (Annex 8E).

2. (U) Baghdad. Baghdad is a city of six million people and is home to
a large number of suspected insurgents and terrorists operating both
in the city and its environs.

(S//NF) From 1 November 2004 to 12 March 2005 there were a total of
3306 attacks in the Baghdad area. Of these, 2400 were directed against
Coalition Forces. (Annex 8E)

3. (U) Route Irish. Route Irish is an East-West road along south
Baghdad. It is approximately 12 kilometers long and runs from the
International Zone in downtown Baghdad to BIAP. The highway is a
four-lane road with a 50 meter wide median. (Annexes 8E, 144K).

(U) Route Irish has six major intersections. Each of these has been
assigned a corresponding checkpoint number by Coalition Forces to
facilitate command and control. Entry Control Point 1 (ECP 1) is
located at one end of the highway near BIAP. Checkpoints 539-543
follow the road east going into downtown. (Annex 141K).

(U) Checkpoint 541 refers to the intersection of Route Irish with
Route Vernon (also known as Route Force), which runs North-South.
(Annex 142K).

(U) Route Irish is commonly referred to as "the deadliest road in
Iraq" by journalists, Soldiers, and commanders. There is no
corresponding alternative route from downtown Baghdad (and the
International Zone) to BIAP, which gives the route a heavy traffic
flow and causes Coalition convoy movement to become more predictable.
These conditions make Route Irish a lucrative target area for
insurgents to employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of varying
types and to achieve effects in terms of casualties. Soldiers in 1st
Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division have come to refer to Route
Irish as "IED Alley." (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) Between 1 November 2004 and 12 March 2005, there were 135
attacks or hostile incidents that occurred along Route Irish. These
included 9 complex attacks (i.e., a combination of more than one type
of attack, e.g., an IED followed by small arms fire or mortars), 19
explosive devices found, 3 hand grenades, 7 indirect fire attacks, 19
roadside explosions, 14 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 15 vehicle
borne explosive devices, and 4 other types of attacks. (Annexes 1E,
8E).

(S//NF) The attack density for the period 1 November 2004 to 12 March
2005 is 11.25 attacks per mile, or a minimum of one attack per day
along Route Irish since November. (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) The highest concentration of IED attacks occurs at 1000 hours,
with the second highest concentration of attacks occurring at 1600
hours. These times correspond to convoys departing from or arriving at
the Victory Base complex, the largest Coalition military facility in
Baghdad. (Annex 5E).

(S//NF) Approximately 66 percent of all night time attacks along Route
Irish occur between the hours of 1900 and 2100. (Annex 8E). The
incident at BP 541 occurred between 2030 and 2100 hours on 4 March
2005.

(U) The majority of IED and VBIED attacks occur in and around three
overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543) and the turnoff to the
International Zone. As mentioned earlier, CP 541 is the location where
the incident occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3E).

C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

1. (U) Methods of Attack

(U) Insurgent attacks throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall
into one of several categories, all of which have occurred along Route
Irish in the past year. They include:
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Unexploded IEDs, Hand Grenades,
Indirect Fire (mortars, rockets, and unidentified indirect fire),
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Small Arms Fire (SAF), Vehicle-Borne
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), and Complex Attacks. The most
common attacks along Route Irish are IEDs, VBIEDs, and SAF. (Annex
8E).

2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs

(U) A large number of evolving techniques have been adopted by the
insurgents in placing IEDs along Route Irish. Examples of currently
used techniques are listed below:

1? (S//NF) Explosives positioned alongside guard rails. The large
number of guard rails on the road make these devices difficult to
detect and relatively easy to emplace by staging equipment in vehicles
or near overpasses, and, in a matter of minutes, having the IED armed
and in the desired location.

1? (S//NF) Explosives wrapped in a brown paper bag or a plastic trash
bag. This is a particularly easy method of concealment, easy to
emplace, and has been used effectively against Coalition Forces and
civilians along Route Irish.

2? (S//NF) Explosives set on a timer. This technique is new to the
Route Irish area, but is being seen more frequently.

3? (S//NF) Use of the median. The 50 meter wide median of Route Irish
provides a large area for emplacing IEDs. These can be dug in, hidden,
and/or placed in an animal carcass or other deceptive container.

4? (S//NF) Surface laid explosives. The enemy will drop a bag
containing the explosive onto the highway and exit the area on an
off-ramp with the detonation occurring seconds or minutes later
depending on the desired time for the explosion.

5? (S//NF) Explosives on opposite sides of the median. Devices have
been found along both sides of the median that were apparently
designed to work in tandem, to counter Coalition Force tactics to
avoid the right side of the highway while traveling Route Irish.

6? (S//NF) Explosives hidden under the asphalt. Insurgents pretend to
do work on the pavement, plant the explosives, and repair the surface.
These are usually remote-detonated devices.

(Annex 11E).

3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs
(U) There are two basic types of car bombs, i.e., suicide (where the
car is moving) and stationary (where the car is parked). Both can be
either command or remote-detonated. (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) The enemy is very skillful at inconspicuously packing large
amounts of explosives into a vehicle. The most commonly used
detonation materials are plastic explosives and 155mm artillery
shells. When moving, these VBIEDs are practically impossible to
identify until it is too late. (Annex 8E).

(U) The techniques for employing VBIEDs continue to evolve. Some of
the more commonly used techniques include:

(S//NF) Multiple suicide vehicles. The first vehicle either creates an opening
for a second, more powerful vehicle, or acts as bait to draw other personnel,
such as medics and other first responders, into the kill zone of the
first vehicle.

As people respond, the second VBIED engages the responders.

? (S//NF) Suicide VBIEDs are typically used against convoys, Coalition Force
patrols, or Coalition checkpoints where they can achieve maximum damage.
Such vehicles will rapidly approach the convoy from the rear and attempt to
get in between convoy vehicles before detonating.

? (S//NF) Stationary VBIEDs are typically parked along main supply routes,
like Route Irish, and often have been found near known checkpoints. These
are usually remotely operated and may be employed in conjunction with a
suicide VBIED.

? (S//NF) A particularly devious technique is for a driver to approach a
checkpoint and claim that he has injured people in his vehicle. The VBIED is
then detonated when Coalition Soldiers approach.
(Annex 8E).

4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks (U) The number of IED detonations from
15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 (the date of the incident), has
steadily increased. Although the effectiveness of those detonations
has decreased over that timeframe, the overall average number of
casualties during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex
4E).

(S//NF) The week of the incident saw 166 IED incidents, with 131
detonations and 35 IEDs rendered safe. There were 82 casualties from
those incidents. (Annex 4E). (U) The number of VBIED detonations from
15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 has also seen a relatively steady
increase. Similar to the decrease in the effectiveness of IEDs, the
effectiveness of VBIEDs has also decreased over that period, but there
have been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large
numbers of casualties. (Annex 4E).

(S//NF) There were 17 VBIEDs detonated during the week of the incident
with five rendered safe. The average casualty per VBIED detonation
that week was 23 due to the large number of casualties that resulted
from a VBIED detonation in Al Hillah. The Al Hillah attack was widely
publicized and caused all Coalition Forces concern as they patrolled
Baghdad and its environs. Any intelligence gained on potential VBIEDs
was passed in the form of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out) message to units
on patrol via FM radio. (Annex 4E).

D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541

(U) Overpasses like Checkpoint 541 are particularly susceptible to
attacks. Such sites provide excellent early observation in all
directions, easy escape routes, and high speed access to Route Irish.
The latter factor is particularly evident at Checkpoint 541 where
there is a long (380 meter) exit lane coming off of southbound Route
Vernon leading to the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 5E).

(S//NF) Checkpoint 541 has been the site of 13 attacks between 1
November 2004 and early March 2005. Two of those attacks involved
VBIEDs. Other attacks included mortars, small arms fire, and IEDs.
(Annex 1E). (U) On the evening of the incident, there were at least
two cases of small arms fire in the immediate vicinity, one before and
one after the incident. Also, as mentioned earlier, while the Joint
Investigation Team was examining the site, a hand grenade was tossed
at the personnel from the Route Vernon overpass. This site is under
the observation of insurgents in the adjoining housing complex and
local neighborhoods anytime a position is established at Checkpoint
541. (Annex 1E).

(S//NF) The two adjoining Route Irish checkpoints, numbers 540 and
542, were also the target of attacks during the 1 November 2004 to
early March 2005 period. Checkpoint 540 had 15 attacks, with three of
those attacks being VBIEDs. Similarly, Checkpoint 542 had 12 attacks
during that period, with two of those attacks being VBIEDs. (Annex
1E).

(U) Furthermore, two days before the incident, two Soldiers from the
same unit (1-69 IN) were killed by an IED at Checkpoint 543. The
Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN lost a very close friend in that attack.
(Annexes 1E, 74C).

E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility

1. (U) Third Infantry Division (3ID)

(U) The Division returned to Iraq in early February 2005. It
conducted a formal Transfer of Authority with the 1st Cavalry Division
and assumed responsibility for MND-Baghdad on 27 February 2005. (Annex
15E).

(S//NF) The Division consists of seven U.S. Brigades and one Iraqi
Brigade. Since their arrival, units of 3ID have conducted 14,463
patrols throughout the Baghdad area, to include 33 Rhino Bus escort
missions (See Section III.C.5. of this report for background
information on the Rhino Bus), through 25 March 2005. (Annex 15E).

(S//NF) In its first month since TOA, 3ID has received 422 attacks
from insurgents resulting in 13 killed and 60 wounded. (Annex 15E).
2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN)

(U) The Second Brigade has been in Iraq for nearly eight months. (Annex 65C).

(U) From 12 August 2004 to 11 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers conducted
approximately 50,000 patrols. The Soldiers also conducted 5,237
Traffic Control Points (TCPs) during that period. (Annex 4E).

(U) Between 15 December 2004 and 13 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers
conducted 712 TCPs in support of Rhino Bus operations. There were
usually eight such TCPs conducted per night in support of Rhino Bus
movements. (Annex 4E).

(U) The "TCPs" that were conducted for the Rhino Bus movements are
more properly called hasty Blocking Positions (BPs). (See Section
III.B. of this report for a discussion of the difference between TCPs
and BPs).

3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion (1-69 IN)

(U) 1-69 IN arrived in the Iraqi Theater of Operations on 4 November
2004. The unit first served in Taji, north of Baghdad where they spent
approximately three months. While in Taji, the primary mission of 1-69
IN was to conduct patrols in search of insurgents responsible for
firing rockets and mortars at Coalition bases. (Annex 10E).

(U) In February 2005, 1-69 IN relocated to Baghdad under the command
and control of 2/10 MTN. The Commander, 1st Cavalry Division assigned
the unit the mission of patrolling and securing Route Irish as of 15
February 2005. (Annex 65C).

(U) Through early April 2005, 1-69 IN had conducted over 2000 patrols
in Iraq. About two-thirds of those patrols were dismounted patrols
requiring the Soldiers to leave their vehicles. About one-third of the
patrols were conducted at night. (Annex 10E).

(U) The unit has conducted over 1000 Traffic Control Points (TCPs)
since arriving in Iraq. Most of those occurred along Route Irish.
Other than the subject incident, there was only one incident involving
civilians (one wounded civilian in Taji). (Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Since arriving in Iraq, 1-69 IN has experienced 19 roadside
explosive devices, 38 incidents of small arms fire, 4 RPGs, 3 VBIEDs,
3 hand grenades, 16 indirect fire attacks, and 2 complex attacks.
(Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Five attacks against 1-69 IN in November resulted in two
fatalities and three wounded. Five detonations in December resulted in
one fatality and three wounded. In January 2005, 1-69 IN received six
detonations that resulted in seven fatalities and three wounded. The
seven fatalities all came in one attack involving 10 buried 155mm
artillery rounds. After relocating to Baghdad in February, the unit
received one attackwith no fatalities or wounded. Through early March,
1-69 IN has received four detonations resulting in three fatalities
and three wounded. (Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Overall, 1-69 IN suffered 10 fatalities and 9 wounded while in
Taji, followed by 3 fatalities and 3 wounded while conducting security
operations on Route Irish. All 13 of the unit's combat related
fatalities in theater have come as a result of IEDs. (Annex 10E).

4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion (1-76 FA)

(U) 1-76 FA was new to the Baghdad AOR, having arrived on 21 February
2005. Their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program began on 22 February
2005. 1-76 FA personnel were in the last night of their Right
Seat/Left Seat Ride program with 2-82 FA and in charge of VIP security
operations on the evening of 4 March 2005. The Transfer of Authority
occurred the next day, 5 March 2005. (Annexes 59C, 63C).

(U) 1-76 FA is responsible for security inside the International Zone
as well as U.S. Embassy VIP movement security along Route Irish.
(Annex 58C). (U) 1-76 FA has Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) to
coordinate directly with 1-69 IN for security along Route Irish. This
is the same level of coordination previously authorized by 1st Cavalry
Division to 2-82 FA. When executing DIRLAUTH, 1-76 FA directly
coordinates an action with units internal or external to its command
and keeps the 3ID commander informed. The 1-76 FA TOC passes all
coordination efforts through the 4th Brigade TOC to 3ID JOC. (Annex
58C).

F. (U) Findings

(U) Route Irish and its checkpoints, particularly the ones at the
three overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543), are continually subject
to attacks from IEDs, VBIEDs, SAF, and other methods of attack. It is
a road filled with dangers that can kill, maim, and injure Soldiers
and civilians. (Annexes 3E, 5E, 8E).

(U) The insurgents are continually adjusting their methods of attack
along the Route Irish corridor. (Annex 11E).

(U) The long straightaway off southbound Route Vernon leading to the
on-ramp to westbound Route Irish provides an excellent opportunity for
a suicide VBIED to build up speed and threaten Soldiers in their
positions. (Annex 5E).

(U) The Soldiers of 1-69 IN had suffered a significant number of
deaths in the four months that they had been in Iraq as of 4 March
2005, including two Soldiers that were killed by an IED at Checkpoint
543 two days before the incident. (Annexes 1E, 10E).

(U) 1-69 IN Soldiers were experienced in patrolling, providing route
security, and conducting TCPs. (Annex 10E). (U) Due to it being their
first full day on shift, 1-76 FA Soldiers lacked experience in issuing
operational orders and in battle tracking security forces during
execution of blocking missions. (Annexes 59C, 63C).