Verbale Calipari - BACKGROUND

BACKGROUND

(U) Administrative Matters

1. (U) Appointing Authority

(U) I was appointed by LTG John R. Vines, Commander, Multi-National
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) on 8 March 2005 to investigate, per U.S. Army
Regulation 15-6 (Annex 1B), all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the incident at a Traffic Control Point (TCP) in Baghdad,
Iraq on 4 March 2005 that resulted in the death of Mr. Nicola Calipari
and the wounding of Ms. Giuliana Sgrena and Mr. Andrea Carpani.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Thelin, USMC was appointed as my legal
advisor for this investigation. I was directed to thoroughly review
(1) the actions of the Soldiers manning the TCP, (2) the training of
the Soldiers manning the TCP, (3) TCP procedures, (4) the local
security situation, (5) enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs), (6) the Rules of Engagement (ROE) employed during the
incident, and (7) any coordination effected with the Soldiers at the
TCP or their higher levels of command on the transport of Ms. Sgrena
from Baghdad to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). (Annex 1A).

(U) The appointing letter (Annex 1A) refers to the location of the
incident as being a Traffic Control Point (TCP). As will be further
explained in this report, the Soldiers involved were actually manning
a former Traffic Control Point, but executing a blocking mission. This
mission took place at a southbound on-ramp from Route Vernon (also
known as Route Force on MNF-I graphics) onto westbound Route Irish,
the road to BIAP. The intersection of these two routes has been
designated as Checkpoint 541. For purposes of this report, the
position will be referred to as Blocking Position 541 (BP 541).

2. (U) Brief Description of the Incident

(U) On the evening of 4 March 2005, personnel of A Company of 1-69
Infantry (attached to 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division),
were patrolling Route Irish, the road linking downtown Baghdad with
BIAP. Seven of those Soldiers were then assigned the mission of
establishing and manning a Blocking Position (BP) on the southbound
on-ramp off Route Vernon to westbound Route Irish. They were to man
the BP until relieved, which was anticipated to be after a convoy
transporting the U.S. Ambassador to Camp Victory had passed and
arrived at its destination.

(U) The Soldiers established the BP by approximately 1930 hours and
began executing their mission. At approximately 2050 hours, the car
carrying Mr. Calipari, Mr. Carpani, and Ms. Sgrena, traveling
southbound on Route Vernon, approached the on-ramp to enter westbound
Route Irish. For reasons that are examined later in this report, the
car came under fire. The shooting resulted in the wounding of the
driver (Mr. Andrea Carpani), and Ms. Sgrena, and the death of Mr.
Nicola Calipari. The Commanding General, Third Infantry Division
directed a commander's inquiry/preliminary investigation be conducted
that night.

B. (U) Constraints and Limitations

(U) Ideally, the scene of the incident would have been preserved as it
existed immediately after the shooting was over and the car had
stopped. Doing so would have allowed the initial investigators to get
precise measurements on the distances and locations of the significant
objects involved in the event. An initial on-site investigation was
conducted, but a number of circumstances that occurred on the site
prevented the incident site from being treated as a sterile site. Both
HMMWVs involved in the blocking position were moved to transport Ms.
Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital in the International Zone.
Further, the scene was not deemed to be a crime scene, and efforts
were made to clear the roadway. As a result, the car was moved from
its position, per the unit's Standing Operating Procedure on
Consequence Management, before a location using a global positioning
system could be obtained. At the direction of the Commander, 2d
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division the car was placed back in the
position that was thought to be its actual stopping point based on
eyewitness testimony and digital photographs taken of the car before
its initial removal from the scene.

(U) A further constraint was the inability to reconstruct the event so
as to provide accurate data for forensic analysis of bullet
trajectory, speed of the vehicle, and stopping distance due to the
inherent danger in the vicinity of the incident location. This was
made evident during a site visit by the Joint Investigation Team when
a hand grenade was thrown (from the Route Vernon overpass) at the
Team's vehicles as members were boarding, injuring one Soldier.

(U) These factors limited the forensic team's ability to conduct an
on-site, in-depth analysis, although extensive tests were performed on
Camp Victory. As a result, the forensic studies of the car could not
be as conclusive as they normally would be.

(U) Other limitations include the removal and disposal of the shell
casings to allow free operation of the turret in the blocking vehicle.
Additionally, the cell phones involved in the incident were returned
to Mr. Carpani before he left the scene. (Annex 4M). More importantly,
while sworn statements were provided by all the key U.S. personnel
involved in the incident, the Italian personnel provided only unsworn
statements as they are not required under Italian law to swear to
statements until appearing before a judge.

C. (U) Format of the Report

(U) This report is divided into five sections; (1) Background, (2)
Atmospherics, including a historical overview of attacks along Route
Irish and prevailing enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs),
(3) Discussion of TCP and BP tactical missions and training received
by BP 541 personnel, (4) Events and actions at BP 541 on the evening
of 4 March 2005, and (5) Coordination effected pertaining to the
hostage recovery. Each section will review the pertinent facts, set
forth findings, and, as appropriate, provide recommendations for
future action. Additionally, documentary evidence used in preparing
this report is included in annexes.