Piccoli cislini crescono

Laureato

Laureato

Laureato

Laureato

Fountain pen disease

Mi sono ammalato.

Mi sono ammalato a causa delle penne stilografica e
per colpa di ebay. Da quando uso ebay non faccio altro
che cercare penne stilografiche su ebay e dovunque
posso.
E per giunta sono riuscito a vincere un'asta.

Ora, siccome ? una penna Sheaffer americana e non
esiste sul mercato italiano l'inchiostro originale per
questa penna, ho pensato bene di ordinare una boccetta
di inchiostro direttamente dall'Iowa, per la modica
cifra di 5,50$

Non penso di andare in rovina o mandare in rovina la
mia famiglia: d'altronde l'ho pagata con la carta di
credito prepagata PostePay...

Bah!

Voglio proprio vedere quando mi arriva!
Stando alle informazioni sul sito non me la manderanno
prima del 26 maggio, perch? sono in giro per una
specie di conferenza sulle "stilo".

Vedremo.

Yahoo! Mail
Stay connected, organized, and protected. Take the tour:
http://tour.mail.yahoo.com/mailtour.html

Mal di schiena

Mi sto innervosendo. Mi si è un po' addolcito, ma
fondamentalmente ce l'ho ancora.
E' una giornata balossa, senza infamia e senza lode.
L'unica cosa degna di nota è che stamattina ho
dovuto mettere la macchina nel parcheggio di
qualcun'altro (n. 19) anziché quello che mi ha
assegnato il dirigente (n. 18), occupato
proditoriamente da un'altra collega.

Attendo istruzioni dal dirigente, quindi scendo a
spostare la macchina. Non faccio a tempo ad
arrivare alla macchina, che quella deficiente di F.P.,
che doveva occupare il parcheggio n. 19, mi ha
toccato la macchina con la sua merdosissima Micra.

Io non mi sono fatto niente, per fortuna. Lei si è
spaccata il paraurti posteriore. Non ha nemmeno
guardato facendo retromarcia.

Bah!

Verbale Calipari - COORDINATION

V. COORDINATION

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section addresses the status of coordination with MNF-I,
MNC-I, and their subordinate units regarding the recovery and
transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. Further, it examines the role
that Captain Green played in this incident.

B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement

(U) When moving through another unit's battlespace in a combat zone,
coordination with forces in the area is required for situational
awareness, and, more importantly, for deconfliction of unit movements,
positioning, and operations. For example, 2/10 MTN has successfully
coordinated and executed previous movements and operations of units
and forces not assigned to their AOR. The unit had coordinated,
sometimes on relatively short notice, with numerous Joint Special
Operations Units, Special Missions Units, and Special Tactics Units
before 4 March 2005, with no incidents. (Annex 65C).

(U) To determine who or what organizations were aware of the Sgrena
recovery and transport operation, sworn statements were taken from key
military officials within MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units
that, by their function, would have had access to information about
such an operation. A statement was also provided by the Political
Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The results are listed
below:

1? (U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the Political Military
Counselor, knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting
incident had occurred. (Annex 114C).

2? (U) No one within the MNF-I leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 1C
to 27C).

3? (U) No one, with one exception to be addressed below, within the
MNC-I leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the
shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 28C to 43C).

4? (U) No one within the 3ID leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 44C
to 56C).

5? (U) No one within 4 BCT knew about the Sgrena operation until after
the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 5M).

6? (U) No one within the 1-76 FA leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 58C
to 63C).

1? (U) No one within the 2/10 MTN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 65C
to 71C).

2? (U) No one within the 1-69 IN leadership knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes
72C, 96C to 99C).

3? (U) No one at the BIAP Command Post knew about the Sgrena operation
until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 110C).

4? (U) No one at the Hostage Working Group knew about the Sgrena
operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex
126C).

5? (U) No one with A Company, 1-69 IN knew about the Sgrena operation
until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 76C, 78C,
80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C).

(U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was
totally unaware of the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March
2005 until after the shooting incident had occurred.

C. (U) Captain Green

(U) Captain Green (USA) is the Aide-de-Camp to Major General Mario
Marioli (ITAR), DCG, MNC-I. (Annex 107C). As early as 28 February
2005, Captain Green was aware that a number of Italian VIPs would be
coming into BIAP. The date for their arrival kept getting pushed back.
He was aware that the VIPs would be involved in working the Sgrena
hostage situation. Captain Green knew no specifics beyond that.
(Annexes 107C, 109C).

(U) At approximately 1330 hours on 4 March 2005, Captain Green,
Lieutenant Colonel Zarcone (ITAR), and one PSD departed for BIAP,
arriving at about 1350 hours. Major General Marioli and another PSD
arrived shortly thereafter. (Annex 107C). The plane finally arrived at
1626. (Annex 1H). Eleven passengers deplaned and were immediately
taken to the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory. There, security badges
were obtained for five of the VIPs. (Annexes 106C, 107C).

(U) Captain Green accompanied three Italian VIPs, Major General
Marioli, and two PSDs in three cars to a location about one kilometer
beyond Checkpoint 539 on Route Irish. Two Italians left, heading into
Baghdad. The rest of the group waited at the site for a short while,
returned to Camp Victory, then went back to the spot past Checkpoint
539. Major General Marioli did not want Captain Green to go back out
to Checkpoint 539, but Captain Green, as his aide, insisted since his
presence would be necessary to interface with the U.S. security forces
in the area. (Annexes 100C, 106C, 107C).

(U) At approximately 2030 hours, Major General Marioli approached
Captain Green and asked him how he was doing and if Lieutenant Colonel
Zarcone had told him what was going on. Captain Green said no, but
that he suspected it had something to do with the Italian journalist.
Major General Marioli said "Yes, but it is best if no one knows."
Captain Green took this as an order from a General Officer not to pass
that information on to anyone. (Annex 109C). Moreover, Major General
Marioli did not intend for Captain Green to take any action whatsoever
on that information. He only told Captain Green so that he would not
be surprised when Ms. Sgrena arrived. (Annex 100C).

(U) Approximately 20 minutes later, a phone call came in to the third
Italian VIP at the site near Checkpoint 539. The call brought news of
the shooting. Captain Green made contact with U.S. personnel in a
nearby Bradley Fighting Vehicle and confirmed the shooting. Captain
Green subsequently was able to speak with Captain Drew at BP 541.
Captain Green discussed the matter with Captain Drew and relayed to
Major General Marioli that it was best for them to return to Camp
Victory as the wounded were being transported to the Combat Support
Hospital in the International Zone. (Annex 107C). Major General
Marioli was very appreciative of Captain Green's coordination efforts
following the shooting. (Annex 100C).

(U) Captain Green was not informed of the recovery and transport of
Ms. Sgrena until a short time before the incident at BP 541 occurred.
(Annex 109C). He was not expected to take any action in the matter as
it was an Italian national issue, nor was he in a position of any
authority to do so. (Annex 100C). He was obeying an order from Major
General Marioli. (Annex 109C).

D. (U) Findings

(U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain
Green), or subordinate units were informed by the Government of Italy
of the hostage rescue mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes
1C to 56C, 58C to 63C, 65C to 72C, 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C,
90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C, 126C, 7M).

(U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on
the part of the Italians as they considered the hostage recovery an
Intelligence mission and a national issue. (Annex 100C).

(U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and
2/10 MTN working with organizations from various agencies outside
their chain of command, it is clear that, while the hostage recovery
operation may have otherwise been a success, prior coordination might
have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a hostile environment, i.e,
a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase
situational awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the
better it is for all involved. (Annex 65C)

Verbale Calipari - THE INCIDENT AT BP 541

IV. THE INCIDENT AT BP 541

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines the shooting incident at BP 541 on the night
of 4 March 2005. The section begins with a description of the site and
then a brief look at the individuals involved. The mission assigned to
the 1-69 IN Soldiers is detailed. The incident itself is then
described. The events immediately following the shooting are addressed
next. Following this is a look at the forensic evidence. The section
concludes with findings and recommendations.

B. (U) Site Description

(U) BP 541 was located on the on-ramp from southbound Route Vernon
onto westbound Route Irish approximately six miles west of the
International Zone in Baghdad. Specifically, BP 541 (Grid 38S MB3571
8371) was located at the intersection of Route Vernon and Route Irish,
which is the second intersection on Route Irish east of Baghdad
International Airport (BIAP). The road leading to the on-ramp begins
where the westernmost lane of Route Vernon separates from the highway.
The on-ramp itself begins near a side street that borders the edge of
a housing area on the west side of the road. This point is
approximately 640 meters south of the nearby underpass on Route
Vernon, and approximately 380 meters from where the road to the
on-ramp splits from Route Vernon. (Annexes 141K, 144K).

(U) At the interchange of the on-ramp and Route Vernon, the highway
becomes an overpass extending over Route Irish. Three separate
concrete Jersey barriers are located in the on-ramp to Route Irish.
The barriers are arranged with the first two barriers on the right
hand side of the on-ramp and the third one on the left hand side of
the on-ramp, but not in a serpentine configuration, as one approaches
from the north. The first barrier is approximately 75 meters from the
concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass near the beginning of
the on-ramp. The second barrier is approximately 37 meters beyond the
first barrier (112 meters from the concrete abutment). The third
barrier is approximately 31 meters beyond the second barrier (143
meters from the abutment). This third, or southernmost, barrier is
approximately 80 meters from where the on-ramp merges with westbound
Route Irish. The total length of the on-ramp is approximately 223
meters. (Annexes 142K, 144K).

(U) From the vantage point of the southernmost barrier, Route Irish is
directly south of the position with a 50-meter median separating the
eastbound and westbound lanes. To the north and northwest of the
position, there is a large open area that is littered with garbage and
debris. The field extends from the bottom of the on-ramp to the side
street and west. Immediately beyond the side street, approximately 150
meters from the southernmost barrier, is a large housing community
with windows and porches that overlook the on-ramp. There is a clear
line of sight from the houses to the on-ramp. The Route Vernon
overpass stands several stories higher than the on-ramp and runs
parallel to the on-ramp until the on-ramp curves to the southwest,
approximately 50 meters from the beginning of the on-ramp. The
overpass is supported by large cylinder concrete supports. The ground
under the overpass is also littered with garbage and debris. (Annexes
16K, 143K).

(U) The road itself is concrete. There is a slight elevation gain
between the beginning of the on-ramp and its merger with Route Irish.
The curve is banked slightly. The on-ramp, but for the Jersey
barriers, is wide enough to accommodate two vehicles abreast of each
other, i.e., it is two-lanes wide. (Annexes 16K, 19K).

C. (U) Personnel Involved

1. (U) Captain Michael Drew, New York Army National Guard, a New York
City Police Department Sergeant was the Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN,
in charge of patrolling Route Irish and establishing blocking
positions at four checkpoints on the night of 4 March 2005. (Annex
1J).

2. (U) First Lieutenant Robert Daniels, New York Army National Guard,
was the Executive Officer for A Company, 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 and
was initially present at BP 541. (Annex 2J).

3. (U) Second Lieutenant Nicolas Acosta, Louisiana National Guard, was
the platoon leader in charge of BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 6J).

4. (U) Sergeant Sean O'Hara, Louisiana National Guard, was in the
overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 8J).

5. (U) Sergeant Luis Domangue, Louisiana National Guard, was the
secondary gunner in the overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005.
(Annex 5J).

6. (U) Specialist Kenneth Mejia, Louisiana National Guard, was the
driver of the overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005, and a
trained combat life saver. (Annex 4J).

7. (U) Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, New York Army National Guard, a
New York City Police Department officer was the acting Platoon
Sergeant at BP 541 and the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle on
4 March 2005. (Annex 7J).

8. (U) Specialist Mario Lozano, New York Army National Guard, was the
gunner on the blocking vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. He had been
an M240B and M249 gunner in previous assignments. (Annex 10J).

9. (U) Specialist Brian Peck, New York Army National Guard, was the
driver of the blocking vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 9J).

10. (U) Sergeant First Class Edwin Feliciano, New York Army National
Guard, was with the Company Commander's vehicle on 4 March 2005.
(Annex 3J).

11. (U) Mr. Nicola Calipari was an Italian military intelligence
officer with the rank of Major General who was in charge of the
recovery of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).

12. (U) Mr. Andrea Carpani is an Italian military intelligence officer
with the rank of Major in the Carabinieri with years of experience
working and driving in Baghdad. He was driving the car involved in the
incident on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).

13. (U) Ms. Giuliana Sgrena is an Italian journalist for Il Manifesto.
She had been kidnapped and held hostage in Baghdad for one month at
the time of her release on the night of 4 March 2005. (Annex 103C).

D. (U) The Mission

1. (U) Receipt of the Mission

(U) The mission of A Company, 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 was their
standard mission, i.e., to provide security along Route Irish. The
mission entailed looking for IEDs and VBIEDs and ensuring Coalition
convoys could safely transit between the International Zone and BIAP.
A Company, 1-69 IN had been performing this mission since 15 February
2005. Their normal patrol shift was 1500 to 2300 daily. (Annex 137C).

(U) While on patrol, Captain Drew received two VBIED BOLO reports via
radio, one for a black car, another for a white car. (Annexes 74C,
13E, 14E). He passed that information via radio to his subordinate
leaders, including Second Lieutenant Acosta, who passed it on to his
troops. (Annexes 74C, 77C).

(U) At 1843 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain received a call from the
1-76 FA Battle Captain asking how quickly they could establish
blocking positions along Route Irish. (Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).

(S//NF) Adverse weather had mandated that the VIP travel by ground
rather than by helicopter, and the Embassy requested that access to
Route Irish be blocked for the movement. (Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).

(S//NF) At approximately 1900 hours, A Company, 1-69 IN received a
mission from its Battalion TOC. A Company was directed to establish
blocking positions on the four westbound on-ramps along Route Irish to
support the movement of a VIP from the International Zone as they
would for a Rhino Bus Run mission. (Annexes 58C, 133C, 137C).

(U) At 1916 hours the 1-76 FA Battle Captain called the 1-69 IN Battle
Captain to order all elements to report to their blocking positions
for the VIP transit. (Annex 3L).

(S//NF) Captain Drew considered the current enemy situation, and
decided to place an M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle at both Checkpoint 542
and Checkpoint 543, and two HMMWVs each at Checkpoint 540 and
Checkpoint 541. He assigned Checkpoint 541 to a team led by Second
Lieutenant Acosta. (Annex 137C).

(U) At approximately 1930 hours, Second Lieutenant Acosta arrived at
Checkpoint 541 with three HMMWVs. He found First Lieutenant Daniels in
position at the on-ramp. Second Lieutenant Acosta relieved First
Lieutenant Daniels. A short time later, Captain Drew pulled up in his
HMMWV, took one of Second Lieutenant Acosta's HMMWVs for placement at
Checkpoint 540, and then left with First Lieutenant Daniels
accompanying him. (Annex 133C).

(U) At 1938 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain reported to the 2/10 MTN
Battle Captain that all blocking positions had been established. The
1-76 FA Battle Captain reported to the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain that
the VIP would depart in approximately five to ten minutes. (Annex 2L).

(U) At 1945 hours, the VIP security convoy NCOIC reported to the 1-76
FA Battle Captain that the convoy with the VIP departed the
International Zone with a destination of Camp Victory. The 2/10 MTN
Battle Captain requested the VIP's convoy departure time and
composition from the 3ID JOC Battle Captain, as they were not in
direct contact with 1-76 FA. Meanwhile, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain
directed 1-69 IN Battle Captain to initiate the Route Irish closure
plan. (Annexes 59C, 64C, 2L).

2. (U) Establishing the Blocking Position

(U) The instructions given to Second Lieutenant Acosta by Captain Drew
were to set up a blocking position to facilitate the movement of a VIP
down Route Irish. (Annex 77C). Captain Drew also issued guidance on
the importance of force protection. (Annex 74C). He expected to
maintain the blocking position no more than 15 minutes. (Annexes 74C,
77C).

(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta emplaced his two vehicles to establish
the blocking position. He positioned the blocking vehicle commanded by
Staff Sergeant Brown on the road, near the outer curb, positioned in
conjunction with the second barrier of three Jersey barriers already
on-site on the on-ramp. Second Lieutenant Acosta placed the overwatch
vehicle by the third Jersey barrier, closest to Route Irish. (Annexes
142K, 143K). In their final positions, both vehicles were facing
toward Route Irish. (Annex 77C).

(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta, using the factors of METT-TC, positioned
the vehicles to provide standoff from the overpass (a common hand
grenade throwing location), a clear line of sight to on-coming
traffic, overwatch field of view (to watch for threats from nearby
buildings), and to allow adequate room for on-coming vehicles to stop
and turn around. (Annexes 77C, 83C).

(U) Staff Sergeant Brown's vehicle was positioned to block traffic
from using the on-ramp to enter Route Irish. The other vehicle was
positioned to provide overwatch of the area as well as to block
traffic entering the on-ramp the wrong way from Route Irish. (Annexes
77C, 83C).

(U) After consulting with Staff Sergeant Brown, Second Lieutenant
Acosta established the Alert Line at the concrete abutment of the
Route Vernon overpass. The Warning Line was established as the second
light pole on the overpass up the on-ramp from the Alert Line.
(Annexes 77C, 83C, 16K).

(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta and Staff Sergeant Brown informed the
gunners of the Alert Line and Warning Line locations, and reviewed
when to shine the spotlight, and when to fire warning shots. (Annexes
77C, 83C).

3. (U) The duties of the Soldiers

(U) Specialist Peck was the driver of the blocking vehicle and was to
remain in the driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes
85C, 130C).

(U) Specialist Lozano was the gunner in the blocking vehicle. He was
to remain in the turret, facing north up the on-ramp toward on-coming
traffic. From there, he was to operate a three million candlepower
hand-held spotlight that he was to shine on approaching vehicles as
soon as possible, even before the Alert Line (he was able to see at
least 20 meters beyond the Alert Line). (Annexes 77C, 79C, 83C, 134C).

(U) Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle
and acting Platoon Sergeant, was to be dismounted so he could execute
local security around his vehicle. (Annexes 83C, 131C).

(U) Specialist Mejia was the driver of the overwatch vehicle and was
to remain in the driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes
89C, 128C).

(U) Sergeant Domangue was to be in the turret of the overwatch vehicle
where he would operate a green laser pointer. He was to shine the
laser pointer on a vehicle as soon as he saw it, but no later than at
the Alert Line, focusing it on the driver's side of the windshield. He
was also to keep watch on the area between Route Irish and the
on-ramp. (Annexes 87C, 129C).

(U) Sergeant O'Hara was to be dismounted from the overwatch vehicle so
as to provide local security for his vehicle. (Annexes 81C, 132C).

(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was to be dismounted so he could
supervise the operation of the BP. (Annexes 77C, 133C).

4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration

(U) Captain Drew, Second Lieutenant Acosta, and Staff Sergeant Brown
were all concerned about the length of time that the Soldiers had been
manning their blocking positions. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C). Captain
Drew was concerned that leaving his Soldiers in a static position for
more than 15 minutes left them open to attack. He was also concerned
that he was not adequately performing his patrolling mission because
his Soldiers were tied down to the blocking positions. (Annex 74C).

(U) Captain Drew checked with the 1-69 IN TOC at least two times
seeking to collapse the blocking positions and return his Soldiers to
their patrolling mission. The 1-69 IN TOC, after checking with 2/10
MTN TOC, informed him that the convoy had not passed and to stay in
position. (Annexes 74C, 2L).

(U) At 2010 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain requested permission
from the 3ID TOC to remove blocking positions until 15 minutes before
VIP movement. (Annex 2L).

(U) At 2014 hours, the 3ID TOC Battle Captain informed the 2/10 MTN
Battle Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN could reduce their blocking
positions until 2018 hours. (Annex 2L).

(U) At 2015 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain reported to the 3ID TOC
Battle Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN blocking positions would remain
in place. (Annex 2L).

(U) At 2020 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain notified 1-69 IN to
keep blocking positions in place. (Annex 2L).

(U) At 2030 hours, Captain Drew asked again about collapsing the
blocking positions. He was told that the word from 3ID was not to move
off the blocking positions, that the convoy would be coming down Route
Irish in approximately 20 minutes, and that the convoy would consist
of four HMMWVs and an up-armored Suburban. (Annexes 97C, 3L).

(S//NF) 1-76 FA was able to communicate the requirement for blocking
positions along Route Irish for a VIP movement from the International
Zone to BIAP. (Annexes 58C, 59C, 62C, 63C). The security escort
platoon with the VIP was able to, and did, relay departure and arrival
times to the 1-76 FA Battle Captain. (Annexes 59C, 64C).

The VIP convoy departed the International Zone in four HMMWVs (and no
Suburban) at approximately 1945 hours. It arrived at the Camp Victory
gate at 2010 hours (Annex 59C). The convoy reached its destination on
Camp Victory at 2020 hours (Annex 59C). The VIP returned to the
International Zone by helicopter at approximately 2205 hours. The
determination to fly by helicopter back to the International Zone was
not made until shortly before the VIP departed as a result of clearing
weather conditions. (Annexes 59C, 64C).

(S//NF) The 1-76 TOC had two means of communicating with 4th Brigade,
its higher headquarters: Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP)2 and FM.
The 1-76 FA Battle Captain was using only VOIP to communicate with
1-69 IN, but experienced problems with VOIP, therefore losing its only
communication link with 1-69 IN, other than going through 4th Brigade.
(Annex 97C). As a result, the Battle Captain was unable to pass
updated information about the blocking mission either directly to 1-69
IN, or to 4th Brigade. He did not attempt to contact 4th Brigade via
FM communications. (Annex 63C). Fourth Brigade, in turn, could not
pass updated information to its major command, 3ID. (Annex 57C).
Likewise, 3ID had no new information to pass to its subordinate
command, 2/10 MTN. Finally, 2/10 MTN was thus unable to pass updated
information to its subordinate command, 1-69 IN. (Annexes 51C, 52C).

(U) There is no evidence to indicate that 1-76 FA passed on the
information about the VIP departure and arrival times to any unit.
(Annexes 59C, 63C). As a result, A Company, 1-69 IN's Soldiers were
directed to remain in their blocking positions.

(U) Other than the duty logs, there are no other written records of
communications or tape recordings among involved units relating to the
coordination to block Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005.
(Annex 6M).

E. (U) The Incident

(U) After arriving at BIAP from Italy in the late afternoon of 4 March
2005, and taking care of some administrative matters, Mr. Carpani and
Mr. Calipari went to some undisclosed location in the Mansour District
of Baghdad. (Annexes 104C, 105C). At approximately 2030 hours they
recovered Ms. Sgrena and headed back toward BIAP. (Annexes 103C, 104C,
109C). Both agents made a number of phone calls to various officials
during the drive. (Annex 104C). Mr. Carpani was mostly talking to his
colleague, Mr. Castilletti, who was waiting for them outside of BIAP
near Checkpoint 539. He updated Mr. Castilletti on his location and
discussed arrangements at the airport. (Annex 105C). Mr. Carpani, who
was driving, had to slow down at one point due to a flooded underpass
on Route Vernon. (Annexes 103C, 104C). Mr. Carpani, who had experience
driving in Baghdad, did not have an alternate route to the airport
planned.

2 (S//NF) 2 VOIP is a technology that allows telephone calls to be
made using a broadband internet connection instead of a regular
(analog) phone line.

(Annexes 104C, 105C). He was taking what he considered to be the most
logical route to BIAP, but was not checking his speedometer. (Annex
105C). Neither he, nor Mr. Calipari, knew the on-ramp to Route Irish
was blocked. (Annex 104C). Indeed, Mr. Carpani believed the road to
the airport was open. (Annex 105C).

(U) At approximately 2045 hours the Soldiers at BP 541 were in the
positions that they had been occupying since 1930 hours. They had
successfully turned around 15-30 vehicles, with none getting more than
a few meters beyond the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C,
132C). Specialist Lozano was in his turret, his M240B (on which he had
last qualified just five days before (Annex 6G)) pointed down and to
his left at a grassy area with Specialist Peck in the driver's seat in
the blocking vehicle. Specialist Mejia was in the driver's seat of the
overwatch vehicle with Sergeant Domangue in the turret. Sergeant
O'Hara was sitting in the rear passenger's seat of the overwatch
vehicle, cleaning his protective glasses. Staff Sergeant Brown, the
acting Platoon Sergeant, was seeking to determine how much longer they
were to remain in position. As such, he was standing with Second
Lieutenant Acosta near the overwatch vehicle, their backs to the
on-ramp. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 128C, 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C).
None of the Soldiers knew that the Italians were coming. (Annexes
116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).

(U) As the car approached the on-ramp to Route Irish, Mr. Carpani was
on the cell phone updating Mr. Castilletti on their position and
reporting that everything was going fine. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Though
not in the habit of checking his speedometer, Mr. Carpani estimated
his speed at 70-80 kph as he exited off of Route Vernon, heading
toward the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 105C). The courtesy light in
the car was on and had been since picking up Ms. Sgrena in the Mansour
District of Baghdad. (Annex 104C). Additionally, Mr. Carpani had his
side window halfway open to listen for possible threats. (Annex 105C).
Ms. Sgrena and Mr. Calipari were in the rear of the car talking to
each other. (Annexes 103C, 105C). The atmosphere in the car was a mix
of excitement over the recovery of Ms. Sgrena, and tension from the
tasks yet to be completed. (Annex 140C).

(U) At approximately 2050 hours, Specialist Lozano saw a car
approaching the on-ramp, approximately 140 meters from his position.
(Annexes 79C, 134C, 144K). Specialist Lozano, holding the spotlight in
his left hand, shined his spotlight onto the car before it arrived at
the Alert Line. (Annexes 79C, 85C). At this time, Sergeant Domangue
acquired the vehicle's headlights and saw the spotlight shining on it.
He then focused his green laser pointer onto the windshield of the car
as it reached the Alert Line. (Annexes 87C, 129C). Both Specialist
Lozano and Sergeant Domangue perceived the car to be traveling in
excess of 50 mph (and faster than any other vehicles that evening).
(Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).

(U) The car crossed the Alert Line still heading towards the Soldiers'
position without slowing down. Specialist Lozano continued to shine
the spotlight, and shouted at the vehicle to stop, a fruitless effort,
but an instantaneous reaction based on his training.

(Annexes 85C, 130C). Without slowing down, the car continued toward
the Warning Line with the spotlight and laser still on it. (Annexes
79C, 87C, 129C).

(U) The car continued to approach at a high rate of speed, coming
closer to the Soldiers than any other vehicle that evening. (Annexes
79C, 87C, 129C). When the car got to the Warning Line, Specialist
Lozano, while still holding the spotlight in his left hand, used his
right hand to quickly fire a two to four round burst into a grassy
area to the on-coming vehicle's right (the pre-set aiming point) as a
warning shot. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 125C, 129C, 134C).

(U) The vehicle maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning
Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). Staff
Sergeant Brown, a New York City Police Officer trained in vehicle
speed estimation, estimated the car was traveling at 50 mph and
believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around the
curve at that speed. (Annex 83C). Specialist Lozano dropped the
spotlight and immediately traversed his weapon from his left to his
right, without having to move the turret, to orient on the front of
the car. With both hands on the weapon, he fired another burst,
walking the rounds from the ground on the passenger's side of the
vehicle and towards the car's engine block in an attempt to disable
it. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The
rounds hit the right and front sides of the vehicle, deflated the left
front tire, and blew out the side windows. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 132C,
1I).

(U) Mr. Carpani reacted by saying into the phone, "they are attacking
us," not knowing who was shooting at him. (Annexes 103C, 104C, 105C).
He stepped on the brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and
dropped the phone. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Specialist Lozano stopped
firing as he saw the car slow down and roll to a stop. Approximately
four seconds had elapsed between the firing of the first round and the
last round, and no more than seven seconds from the time the car
crossed the Alert Line until it came to a stop. (Annexes 77C, 79C,
81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). The car came to a stop
near the middle of the on-ramp, such that the first Jersey barrier was
aligned with the vehicle between the front and back doors. (Annexes
79C, 83C, 105C).

F. (U) Post-Incident Events

(U) Once the car came to a stop, Mr. Carpani got out of the car with
his hands raised, cell phone in one hand, and told the Soldiers that
he was from the Italian Embassy. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C,
104C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). Second Lieutenant Acosta, Staff
Sergeant Brown, Sergeant O'Hara, and Specialist Peck approached the
car with weapons raised and secured the driver. (Annexes 130C, 131C,
132C, 133C). Staff Sergeant Brown patted him down and asked him if
there were others in the car. Mr. Carpani said there were two others
and that there was one weapon on the front seat and another on the
male passenger in the back seat. He warned Staff Sergeant Brown that
both weapons had a round in the chamber. Staff Sergeant Brown then
moved Mr. Carpani about 10 meters away from the car and off to the
side of the road to question him and examine him. After initially
taking control of the cell phones as well as Mr. Carpani's and Mr.
Calipari's identification and badges, Staff Sergeant Brown returned
those items to Mr. Carpani. At some point, Staff Sergeant Brown
directed the car be placed in park since the car continued to roll.
(Annexes 83C, 105C).

(U) Sergeant O'Hara and Second Lieutenant Acosta searched the vehicle.
(Annexes 77C, 81C). Second Lieutenant Acosta ordered Sergeant Domangue
to inform Captain Drew and to send Specialist Mejia over with his
medical kit. Specialist Mejia arrived at the car and found Mr.
Calipari gravely injured. Specialist Mejia was able to bandage Mr.
Calipari's wound, but Mr. Calipari died a few minutes later.
Specialist Peck also tried to assist with Mr. Calipari. He then
returned to the blocking vehicle and relieved Specialist Lozano in the
turret to allow him to collect himself. (Annex 85C, 130C). Specialist
Mejia then turned his attention to Ms. Sgrena's wounds. (Annex 89C,
128C). He tried to administer an IV, but his needles were too large.
Meanwhile, Sergeant O'Hara bandaged Ms. Sgrena's shoulder wound.
(Annexes 128C, 132C).

(U) Captain Drew then arrived on the scene along with Specialist
Silberstein, who was a qualified medic. (Annexes 127C, 128C, 133C,
134C). Specialist Silberstein assessed Ms. Sgrena and treated her for
shock. He then confirmed that Mr. Calipari was dead. (Annex 127C).
Captain Drew assessed the situation, passed all available information
to his command, and ordered the casualties to be evacuated to the
Combat Support Hospital (CSH) in the International Zone for treatment
of their wounds. He also requested an ambulance for Mr. Calipari's
body. (Annexes 74C, 133C, 137C). Ms. Sgrena was loaded into the
blocking vehicle and proceeded to the CSH with the overwatch vehicle
following as U.S. military vehicles do not travel alone. (Annexes
127C, 128C, 129C, 130C, 132C, 133C). Mr. Carpani was transported later
by a separate vehicle from another element of Captain Drew's patrol.
(Annex 136C). All equipment in the vehicle before the shooting was
later returned to Mr. Carpani. (Annex 4M).

(U) Before Mr. Carpani was transported to the CSH, he made at least
seven phone calls on his cell phone. He tried asking how his
companions were but was unable to get an answer. (Annexes 104C, 105C).
Sergeant First Class Feliciano arrived with Captain Drew and found
that Mr. Carpani spoke Spanish, as did Sergeant First Class Feliciano.
He was able to tell Mr. Carpani about the condition of his companions.
(Annex 91C)

(U) Mr. Carpani told Sergeant First Class Feliciano who Ms. Sgrena was
and that he was trying to get to the airport. He told Sergeant First
Class Feliciano that he heard shots from somewhere, and that he
panicked and started speeding, trying to get to the airport as quickly
as possible. Mr. Carpani further told Sergeant First Class Feliciano
that he continued to speed down the ramp, and that he was in a hurry
to get to the airport. (Annexes 91C, 136C).

(U) Mr. Carpani became a little dizzy, so Sergeant First Class
Feliciano got some water for him. Mr. Carpani kept making phone calls.
He contacted Mr. Castilletti who put Captain Green on the phone. Mr.
Carpani then had Captain Drew talk to Captain Green. Mr. Carpani kept
on insisting that he wanted to go to the airport. After one of the
phone calls, though, he said he needed to go to the hospital where Ms.
Sgrena had been taken. (Annex 91C).

(U) The incident was reported through command channels, and the
Commanding General, 3ID ordered an immediate commander's
inquiry/preliminary investigation into the incident. Before the
investigator had arrived on the scene, the HMMWVs involved in the
incident had departed to the CSH and the car had been moved in an
effort to clean up the site so that the on-ramp could be re-opened.
The Commander, 2/10 MTN arrived about two hours after the incident and
ordered the car be put back in its stopped position to support the
commander's inquiry as much as possible. (Annex 65C).

G. (U) Forensic Evidence

1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report

(U) Photographs of the incident scene were taken in the hours after
the incident by Combat Camera personnel, as advised by CID personnel.
(Annexes 32K ? 69K). The exact locations of the three incident
vehicles could not be determined since the two HMMWVs had been moved
upon transporting Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital, and the
car had been moved during cleanup efforts at the site. (Annex 5I).

2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report

(U) The forensic investigation of the incident scene conducted on the
morning of 11 March 2005 provided the following distances between
relevant points based on GPS measurements3:

1? (U) Blocking vehicle to Alert Line ? 389 feet, 7 inches (118.8 meters)

2? (U) Blocking vehicle to Warning Line ? 272 feet (82.9 meters)

3? (U) Blocking vehicle to disabled vehicle stop point ? 125 feet (38.1 meters)

? (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Warning Line ? 147
feet (44.8 meters)

? (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Alert Line ? 264
feet, 7 inches (80.7 meters)

? (U) Alert Line to Warning Line ? 117 feet, 7 inches
(35.9 meters) (Annexes 5I, 143K).
4

(U) 3 The position of the Toyota was determined from photographs taken
before it was moved during cleanup efforts. The blocking vehicle
location comes from GPS readings provided by the Preliminary
Investigating Officer based on witness statements regarding its
position at the time of the incident.

3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report

(U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal
from the scene. This analysis disclosed 11 entrance bullet holes. They
are consistent with 7.62 mm bullets. Three bullets perforated the
front section of the car at the bumper, right head light, and right
fender. Two bullets perforated the windshield. Six bullets perforated
the right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. No
bullet holes or ricochet damage was noted on the car's undercarriage.
(Annex 1I).

(U) The trajectory analysis demonstrated that all 11 bullets came from
one point of origin. The actual distance from the car to the machine
gun could not be conclusively determined because of several variables:
the grade of the curve and curvature of the roadway; depressions or
elevations of the terrain; the lateral movement of the car; human
reaction time, modulation of speed and braking by the driver; a flat
tire; and lateral and vertical movement of the machine gun. The
security situation at the incident site prevented examiners from
visiting the scene. (Annex 1I).

4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples

(U) On Friday, 25 March 2005, a certified radar operator conducted two
traffic samples at BP 541. From 1809 hours to 1824 hours, 27 vehicles
were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 44 mph. The
average speed at the beginning of the on-ramp's curve was 24 mph. From
1956 hours to 2015 hours, 30 vehicles were clocked. The average speed
at the Alert Line was 46 mph. The average speed at the beginning of
the curve was 26 mph. Unlike the night of the incident, which was also
a Friday, the road was dry during these samples. (Annex 1M).

5. (U) Number of Rounds

(U) The ammunition box in the blocking vehicle originally contained
200 rounds. There were 142 rounds remaining in the M240B ammunition
box. No casings were collected. Eleven rounds hit the vehicle. The
weapon had been fired on seven previous occasions using the same
ammunition box. As such, there were no more than 40 additional rounds
that could have been fired. (Annexes 85C, 99C).

H. (U) Findings

(U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was under a time constraint to establish
the BP quickly and expected to be in position for a very limited time,
i.e., no more than 15-20 minutes. Further, the position was on a tight
curve that caused Second Lieutenant Acosta to make less than optimal
choices in positioning his vehicles. Still, Second Lieutenant Acosta
properly considered and employed the factors of METT-TC in deciding
where to emplace his two vehicles so as to provide vehicle stand-off,
force protection, overwatch field of view, and clear line of sight for
the spotlight operator. From 15-30 vehicles were turned around without
incident based upon how the position was established. (Annexes 77C,
79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 1F, 2F, 3F).

(U) At the time of the incident, there were only two HMMWVs, and seven
U.S. military personnel, at BP 541. Both the blocking vehicle and the
overwatch vehicle were positioned on the on-ramp, facing Route Irish.
There were no other vehicles, or Soldiers in the immediate vicinity of
BP 541, and the BP could not be seen by any other BPs on Route Irish.
(Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C,
121C, 122C, 123C, 124C).

(U) The Soldiers had a heightened sense of awareness because of the
two VBIED BOLOs, one for a black car, another for a white car.
(Annexes 74C, 77C, 13E, 14E). Given the number of vehicles that had
been stopped and turned around, and this awareness of VBIEDs, it is
highly unlikely that Specialist Lozano was not paying attention.
Further, Specialist Lozano had recently rotated into the position,
replacing Specialist Peck, to ensure that there was a fresh set of
eyes in the turret. (Annexes 79C, 85C). Rotating qualified personnel
in and out of the turret to maintain alertness was a wise decision by
the BP 541 leadership.

(U) Ineffective battle tracking procedures (communications, log
posting, and information sharing) at the 1-76 FA TOC caused A Company,
1-69 IN to be left in their blocking positions longer than expected.
The night of 4 March 2005 was the last night of the Left Seat Ride for
1-76 FA, and 4-5 March 2005 was the first full duty day for the unit.
(Annexes 59C, 63C, 97C).

(U) The spotlight and green laser pointer had proven effective in
stopping and turning around vehicles before the car with the Italians
arrived at the on-ramp. Many of the vehicles, though, screeched their
tires when stopping. While effective for accomplishing the mission,
the spotlight and laser pointer may not be the best system from a
civilian point of view. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C)

(U) Specialist Lozano did not drop the spotlight until after he fired
the warning shots, then immediately transitioned to two hands on his
weapon as he fired the disabling shots. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 85C, 87C).

(U) Specialist Lozano spotlighted the car before it reached the Alert
Line, fired warning shots as it reached the Warning Line, and fired on
the vehicle in an attempt to disable it immediately after it crossed
the Warning Line. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).
(U) Specialist Lozano was the only one to fire his weapon. (Annexes
77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C).
(U) The car was traveling at approximately 50 mph as it crossed the
Warning Line. (Annex 83C).
(U) Mr. Carpani did not apply his brakes until after the rounds began
striking the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C).
(U) Given the cyclic rate of fire of the M240B, Specialist Lozano's
expertise with the weapon, and that only 11 rounds struck the vehicle
with only five of those impacting the front of the car, it is highly
unlikely that any shots were fired after the car came to a stop.
(Annexes 79C, 6G, 1I, 3M).
(U) Both the blocking and overwatch vehicles were moved after the
incident as directed by Captain Drew to transport Ms. Sgrena to the
Combat Support Hospital. Both vehicles were needed to provide security
for the move to the hospital. (Annexes 74C, 77C).

(U) The gunner complied with the Rules of Engagement. After operating
the spotlight, and perceiving the on-coming vehicle as a threat, he
fired to disable it and did not intend to harm anyone in the vehicle.
(Annexes 79C, 83C).

(U) There were a number of unrelated events that had a role in the
incident. These were: (1) bad weather forcing a VIP to convoy on Route
Irish that evening vice the preferred method of traveling by
helicopter; (2) communications problems involving a unit new to the
AOR that caused the Soldiers to be left in position longer than
expected; (3) the recovery of Ms. Sgrena being pushed back daily, for
several days, to 4 March 2005; (4) the Italians did not know the
Soldiers were at the on-ramp, and were not expecting any such
roadblocks; and (5) the Soldiers did not know the Italians were
traveling to BIAP. (Annexes 51C, 52C, 57C, 59C, 60C, 61C, 63C, 97C,
104C, 105C, 107C, 109C, 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).

(U) Mr. Carpani was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by
the Soldiers that evening. He failed to stop for the spotlight since
he was not expecting a roadblock. Additionally, he was dealing with
multiple distractions including talking on the phone while driving,
the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen for threats,
driving on a wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need
to get to the airport, and the excited and tense atmosphere in the
car. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 125C, 140C). Any one of these would have
affected his reaction time.

I. (U) Recommendations

(S//NF) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the use
of additional non-lethal measures (e.g., spike strips, temporary speed
bumps, and wire) be emplaced to slow down or stop vehicles before the
use of disabling shots. The intent is to provide as many non-lethal
options as possible before asking a Soldier to focus on firing the
weapon.

(U) Recommend that the Force Protection Working Group, in conjunction
with MNC-I Information Operations, propagate a Public Awareness/Public
Service Campaign to inform all drivers of their responsibilities for
behavior when approaching and while at Coalition Checkpoints. This
information could be posted on panels or boards at airports and other
major transportation centers, as well as in pamphlets to be
distributed from various locations, to include rental car agencies and
border control points. This public awareness campaign should enhance
safe operations by promoting mutual trust, cooperation, and confidence
for Coalition Forces and Iraqi citizens as well as formally outlining
expected driver behavior throughout the AOR.

(U) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the
following points as they develop the MNC-I SOP for TCP operations:

1? (S//NF) Different signs for ECPs, TCPs, and BPs. For example:

0o (S//NF) Road Closed ? Do Not Enter (for BPs).

1o (S//NF) Coalition Checkpoint Ahead ? Proceed Slowly and Follow
Directions (for TCPs).

(U) Signs written in Arabic and English should, where possible, also
incorporate international symbols to accommodate foreign nationals as
they begin operating in Iraq.

1? (S//NF) Highly visible and quickly deployable checkpoint and
roadblock warning signs for Soldiers on patrol.

2? (S//NF) Standards for when and how to use spotlights and lasers.

3? (S//NF) The use of hand-held signs as an alternative to
hand-and-arm signals.

(U) Recommend a review of frequently established TCP locations to
consider the use of existing permanent highway overpass signs that
warn drivers that checkpoints may be upcoming (e.g., "Possible
Checkpoint Ahead ? Next Exit").

(S//NF) Recommend an assessment of the current technique of requiring
the gunner to operate both the spotlight and the weapon in the turret
of the vehicle. This will allow more reaction time and simplify duties
and responsibilities of the gunner.

(U) Further recommend a transition to a more driver friendly alert
signal by substituting devices such as rotating warning lights and
sirens to replace spotlights as early warning tools.

(U) Recommend periodic reviews of Right Seat/Left Seat Ride Relief in
Place procedures based on:

1? (S//NF) Transfer of Authority between units (before and after).

2? (S//NF) Changes in MTOE equipment.

3? (S//NF) Significant changes in the operational environment.

(S//NF) These reviews will ensure there is rigor in enforcing
standards and essential tasks in accordance with existing SOPs.
Further recommend MSC enforcement of "Right Seat/Left Seat Ride"
certification programs where outgoing commanders certify incoming
units' ability to perform required tasks before TOA. This will ensure
Soldiers and leaders can properly execute tasks to standard and
understand the reasons for tasks that deviate from established
procedures as a result of any recent changes.

(S//NF) Recommend the MSC Commanders review MNF FRAGO 1269/5 2005 Dec
04 with subordinate commands to ensure thorough fratricide reporting
and investigation of fratricide incidents. The use of Rapid Response
Teams (SJA, PAO, PMO, CID, Safety, etc.) to provide support to the
on-site commander is highly recommended.

(U) Recommend development of a casualty post-incident procedure
reference guide to assist junior leaders in accurately preserving
incident scenes as much as time and the tactical situation allow.

(S//NF) Some key pieces of information could include:

1? (S//NF) Diagram of the scene to include exact grid of locations of
personnel/equipment included.

2? (S//NF) Amount of ammunition expended.

3? (S//NF) Digital photos.

4? (S//NF) Chronology of events.

5? (S//NF) Personnel involved with the incident.

6? (S//NF) Personnel on-site at the time of the incident.

? (S//NF) Permission to stand down or remove any equipment.
(U) Recommend that no disciplinary action be taken against any Soldier
involved in the incident.

(U) Recommend that this report be circulated to all MNC-I Major
Subordinate Commanders for use as an After Action Review tool.

Verbale Calipari - TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING

III. TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines TCPs, BPs, and training matters. It first
discusses the difference between a TCP and a BP. Standing Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for the various units involved regarding TCPs and
BPs are assessed, and the Rhino Bus TTP is outlined. This is followed
by a review of the training on TCPs, BPs, weapons, and Rules of
Engagement (ROE) that the Soldiers manning BP 541 had received before
4 March 2005. The ROE that were in effect that night are explained.
The section concludes with findings and recommendations.

B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions

(U) Task Force 1-69 IN had received missions to establish TCPs and
blocking positions numerous times in the past. Although the terms are
used interchangeably (Annex 65C), there are subtle, but distinct,
differences in approach to establishing the two positions. (Annex
96C).

(S//NF) A traffic control point involves
(1) the stopping of a vehicle, (2) a search of that vehicle, and (3)
the authorized passage of the vehicle through the control point.
(Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C, 72C). TCPs can be of limited or extended
duration. (Annex 97C).

(S//NF) A blocking position, in contrast, does not involve the search
of a vehicle. Ideally, the underlying intent of a blocking position
involves no contact with a vehicle. In Iraq, the purpose of a BP is
twofold: (1) to prevent vehicles from gaining access to the protected
location, and (2) to prevent VBIEDs from getting close enough to kill
or injure Soldiers or civilians. Blocking positions are neither
intended nor designed to allow traffic to pass. The intent is to
achieve maximum standoff from approaching vehicles and force them to
turn around. (Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C). Blocking positions can be
temporary or for longer durations. (Annex 97C). As indicated to 1-69
IN during Relief in Place operations, patrols must be prepared to
execute hasty BPs when required.

C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005

(U) SOPs are designed to serve as guidelines for specific operations
and are not prescriptive in nature. They provide a baseline for
acceptable operations from which commanders can derive principles and
techniques and adapt them to their current mission. (Annexes 44C, 65C,
72C, 96C, 98C).
1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks (Army Field Manual
3-21.9, Chapter 7)

(U) Construction and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks are high
frequency tasks for an infantry company and subordinate elements when
they must establish area security during stabilization operations.
(Annex 5F).

(U) A checkpoint is a predetermined point used as a means of
controlling movement, such as a place where military police check
vehicular and pedestrian traffic, to enforce circulation measures and
other law, order, and regulations. (Annex 5F).

(U) A roadblock is used to limit the movement of vehicles along a
route or to close access to certain areas or roads. Checkpoints and
roadblocks can be either deliberate or hasty. The primary difference
is the extent of planning and preparation conducted by the
establishing force. (Annex 5F).

(U) Checkpoints and roadblocks may be established to:

1? (U) Check and/or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles in
and out of the controlled area.

2? (U) Deter illegal movement.

3? (U) Create an instant roadblock.

4? (U) Control movement into the area of operations or on a specific route.

5? (U) Prevent smuggling and contraband.

(Annex 5F).

(U) The layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and
roadblocks should reflect the considerations of Mission, Enemy,
Terrain, Troops Available ? Time, Civilians (METT-TC), especially the
time available for emplacing them. (Annex 5F). The following factors
should be considered in establishing a checkpoint or roadblock:

1? (U) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it is visible and
where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass without
being observed.

2? (U) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into
the search area.

? (U) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within
sight, to deter resistance to Soldiers
manning the checkpoint. It must be able to engage
vehicles attempting to break through or
bypass a checkpoint. (Annex 5F).

(U) Many items are used to reinforce a roadblock or a checkpoint.
These include: barrels filled with sand, water, or heavy concrete
blocks (emplaced to slow and canalize vehicles), concertina wire
(emplaced to control movement around the checkpoint), and signs
stating the speed limit into and out of the checkpoint (in both
English and the local language.) (Annex 5F).

2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP

(S//NF) In 3ID's published Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP),
there is a section directly addressing traffic control points. A TCP
is defined as a "Structured Engagement Area." The 3ID FSOP does not
include guidelines for positions with a blocking mission (i.e.,
blocking positions). (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The TCP SOP calls for an Alert Line, a Warning Line, a Stop
line, a Search Area, and an Overwatch Area. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The Search Area should be a well-lit checkpoint, provide
standoff from neighborhood structures, allow a sufficient area to
accommodate more than one search team, the establishment of warning
signs with sufficient distance for drivers to react, the use of
physical barriers to force vehicles to slow down, and other barriers
like tire poppers, to block movement of vehicles attempting to
continue through the search area. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The Warning Line and Alert Line should provide maximum
standoff for oncoming traffic. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) Soldiers should fire into engine blocks before engaging the
driver. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) The equipment for a TCP includes warning signs, triangles,
sawhorses, traffic cones, and/or tire poppers. (Annex 1F).

(S//NF) Minimum leader requirements for executing a TCP are listed as
(1) map reconnaissance, (2) mission briefing, (3) safety briefing, and
(4) back brief to the commander or designated representative. Position
selection considerations are not specifically addressed. (Annex 1F).

3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP

(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN's published Tactical Standing Operating
Procedures (TACSOP) addresses checkpoint operations. The TACSOP does
not provide guidance on blocking positions. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) A unit establishes checkpoints to control its area of
responsibility, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and contribute to
security of military units as well as the populace. They must be
established to ensure that the position cannot be bypassed. (Annex
2F).

(S//NF) The 2/10 MTN TACSOP distinguishes between vehicle checkpoints
(VCPs) and personnel checkpoints (PCPs). These are further divided
into three types: deliberate, hasty, and flying. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Deliberate checkpoints are permanent or semi-permanent. They
are used near operating bases or along Main Supply Routes (MSRs).
(Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Hasty checkpoints are planned in advance and will be
maintained for a set period of time of short duration. Hasty
checkpoints are frequently employed during the conduct of vehicle or
foot patrols. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) Flying, or immediate, checkpoints are conducted when specific
intelligence indicates that a checkpoint will hinder the enemy's
freedom of movement at a specific time and place. They are conducted
immediately and often with little or no planning. (Annex 2F). Although
not a TCP mission, the mission given to 1-69 IN to block Route Irish
on 4 March 2005 fell into this category.

(S//NF) Vehicle checkpoints should consist of four zones: canalization
zone, turning or deceleration zone, search zone, and safe zone. (Annex
2F).

(S//NF) The canalization zone uses natural obstacles and/or artificial
obstacles to canalize the vehicles into the checkpoint. It usually
consists of disrupting or turning obstacles, such as serpentines and
other barrier systems. Warning signs should be placed at least 100
meters in front of the checkpoint. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The turning or deceleration zone forces vehicles to make a
rapid decision, i.e., decelerate, make slow hard turns, or maintain
speed and crash into obstacles. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The search zone is a relatively secure area where personnel
and vehicles are positively identified. (Annex 2F). (S//NF) The safe
zone is the assembly area for the checkpoint that allows personnel to
eat, sleep, and recover in relative security. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The use of radios or cell phones should be limited to
essential communications and/or entirely prohibited as their
transmissions may detonate any IEDs present. (Annex 2F).

(S//NF) The SOPs used by 2/10 MTN originated with the 1st Armored
Division, and then were adopted by the 1st Cavalry Division, and in
turn by 3ID. (Annexes 66C, 67C). It is noted that the SOP is not
prescriptive, i.e., there is no requirement for signs, only a
suggestion. (Annex 2F). Soldiers and leaders alike acknowledged using
this SOP as a reference for establishing blocking positions, adopting
certain procedures and equipment as required. (Annexes 65C, 66C, 98C).

4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN has its own Tactical Standard Operating Procedures
(TACSOP). It is a modified version of the 256th Brigade TACSOP.
(Annexes 72C, 98C, 3F). It addresses checkpoint operations, but not
blocking positions. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 3F). In addition, there are
checklists for equipment to be used at TCPs. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The TCPs described in the 1-69 TACSOP are of a more enduring
nature than those described in 2/10 MTN's TACSOP. Even hasty
checkpoints are more like 2/10 MTN's deliberate checkpoints. There is
no similar position as the flying or immediate TCP described by the
2/10 MTN SOP. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The Battle Drill for TCP occupation described in the 1-69 IN
TACSOP is the same as that found in 3ID's FSOP. (Annexes 1F, 3F).

(S//NF) The Battalion considers barriers as mandatory equipment for
blocking positions (Annexes 96C, 97C, 98C). These can be existing
barriers on site or other obstacles such as concertina wire. (Annexes
96C, 98C). The team at BP 541 considered the on-site Jersey barriers
as meeting this requirement. (Annexes 74C, 77C).

(S//NF) Signs are required for TCPs. (Annex 96C). Signs were not used
at BPs by 4-5 Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 1-69 IN's predecessor.
Based on their experience, the opinion of the BP 541 Soldiers was that
signs had been marginally effective for TCPs conducted in the daytime
in Taji. They were less effective at night. During both day and night
operations, the signs were easily bypassed. (Annexes 79C, 87C).

(S//NF) The Soldiers have found concertina wire to be effective at
TCPs in the daytime. Wire becomes quite ineffective at night as
motorists cannot see it, even when chemlights are attached to it.
Furthermore, the BP 541 Soldiers believed that the emplacement of
concertina wire exposes them to additional risk. (Annexes 79C, 87C).

(S//NF) The signs that A Company, 1-69 IN Soldiers had used in Taji
had not been available since their move to Baghdad on 5 February 2005.
(Annexes 81C, 112C). On or about 12 February 2005, the signs were
unloaded and stored next to a conex. There were approximately 25 signs
in this shipment. These were TCP signs that said "Stop and Wait to be
called forward." Other signs that had been for the rear of vehicles
said "Stay back 100 meters or you will be shot." The last part of that
phrase "or you will be shot" was to be covered with tape. (Annex
112C). The signs had not been modified, and, therefore, not reissued
as of 4 March 2005. (Annex 95C).

5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information

(U) Since October 2004, there had been significant insurgent contact
on Route Irish. Most of the contacts were RPGs, SAF, IEDs, and VBIEDs.
These attacks prompted a re-assessment of the Coalition's responses
for operations along Route Irish.

(S//NF) Route Irish is the primary route to BIAP for U.S. Embassy
personnel, and there was routinely at least one convoy each day. Rhino
buses (armored buses) were procured to provide better protection for
passengers. Additionally, a series of briefings and plans were
developed to address the insurgent situation along Route Irish. The
result was the Rhino Bus Run Program. (Annex 65C).

(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run Program, 1-76 FA escorts two or three
Rhino armored buses and one or two baggage trucks to and from the
Embassy staging area in the International Zone and the BIAP passenger
terminal twice nightly, seven days a week. Each run consists of up to
65 escorted passengers. This is the standard TTP 1-76 FA learned
during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program conducted by 2-82 FA as
part of Relief in Place operations. 1-76 FA's higher headquarters,
Fourth Brigade, coordinates attack helicopter support to conduct route
reconnaissance ahead of the convoy and Close Air Support in the event
of an attack. (Annex 59C).

(S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run TTP, 1-76 FA identifies the escort
platoon. Once the escort platoon leader receives the number of
passengers for transport at the staging area, and has established
communications with the attack helicopters, the 1-76 FA TOC requests
clearance from the 3ID TOC (the battlespace owner) through 4th Brigade
TOC to move the convoy. Once 4th Brigade receives clearance from 3ID
TOC, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain contacts 1-69 IN Battle Captain and
requests that they establish blocking positions along Route Irish.
Once the 1-69 IN Battle Captain notifies the 1-76 FA Battle Captain
that the units are set in position, the convoys depart from the
staging area. Once the convoy has passed ECP 1, the 1-76 FA Battle
Captain contacts the 1-69 IN Battle Captain and clears the units to
open their blocking positions. The same process is followed for the
reverse trip. (Annex 59C).

(U) There is no written SOP that covers Rhino Bus operations. The TTPs
that 1-76 FA used on 4 March 2005 are the same TTPs employed by 2-82
FA. (Annex 59C).

D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers

(U) The Soldiers manning BP 541 on 4 March 2005 received SOP training
on TCPs at Fort Hood and the National Training Center (NTC). (Annexes
72C, 96C, 97C, 98C). The training at Fort Hood was part of
mobilization training, and was conducted by the Battalion leadership
and the Mobilization Assistance Team, while the training at NTC
occurred as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. (Annex 96C).

(S//NF) The Soldiers were trained to the following standards for TCPs:
(1) 360 degree security, (2) one element controls traffic entry to the
TCP, and (3) one element conducts searches and operates the detainee
holding area. Soldiers are to control traffic effectively and
efficiently, keep Soldiers safe, and accomplish the mission. (Annex
96C).

(S//NF) The Battalion Commander gave verbal guidance at Fort Hood on
using M4s as the primary weapon for firing warning shots. This was
intended for mounted mobile operations as a TTP for clearing overhead
passes instead of static blocking positions due to difficulty in
traversing the gunner's turret. (Annex 73C).

(S//NF) There is no evidence to indicate that the Soldiers were
trained to execute blocking positions before arriving in theater. TTPs
for blocking positions and other operations were learned and practiced
during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride exercises as part of the Relief
in Place/Transfer of Authority process with the Soldiers of 4-5 ADA
from 5 to 15 February 2005. Gunners and leaders were able to watch
tasks being performed before they had to perform these tasks
themselves under the supervision of 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C,
98C, 9G). These TTPs were accepted by the 1-69 IN Battalion Commander
as approved higher headquarters sanctioned guidance. (Annex 72C).

(S//NF) The 4-5 ADA blocking position TTP called for one vehicle,
either a HMMWV or a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, to pull up next to the
last Jersey barrier (closest to Route Irish). The Soldiers at the BP
would then use a hand-held spotlight and laser pointer to get drivers'
attention, and make them stop and turn around. Normally, these
blocking positions, which were hasty in nature, would be held for
10-15 minutes before the TOC would order the road opened. Signs were
not used by 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 74C, 83C).

(S//NF) As demonstrated by 4-5 ADA previously, the standard practice
by Alpha Company, 1-69 IN personnel at blocking positions is for the
gunner to use the spotlight, while the HMMWV commander or Truck
Commander operates the laser pointer. If the gunner must fire his
weapon, M4 or M240B, he drops the hand-held light to engage the threat
with well-aimed fire using both hands. (Annexes 74C, 79C). There is no
specific training for operating the spotlight and the M240B
simultaneously. (Annex 66C).

(U) Based upon the fact that two 1-69 IN Soldiers were killed by an
IED two nights before at Checkpoint 543, his experience, training, and
risk assessment, the Alpha Company Commander chose to augment the 4-5
ADA TTP on 4 March 2005 by placing two HMMWVs at BP 541 for additional
force protection. Force protection was paramount in his mind because
of the threat of IEDs and VBIEDs. (Annex 74C). As a result, Second
Lieutenant Acosta tasked the overwatch vehicle gunner to operate the
green laser pointer rather than have Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck
Commander do so. (Annexes 77C, 87C).

E. (U) Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers

(U) The Soldiers were trained on ROE as part of their deployment
preparation at Fort Hood and the National Training Center (NTC), as
well as in Kuwait and Iraq. (Annexes 111C, 128C, 134C). The training
at Fort Hood and NTC centered on basic ROE concepts of the escalation
of force, hostile intent, hostile act, and positive identification.
Specifically, Soldiers were briefed on the right of self defense,
which allows them to defend themselves and Coalition Forces with all
necessary force to negate the potential threat. Soldiers also received
training in graduated force, which is designed to allow them to employ
escalating measures of non-lethal force to properly discern hostile
intent and prevent accidental civilian injury. Soldiers were briefed
on positive identification (PID), which requires Soldiers to have a
reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a proper military
target. Soldiers were also briefed on the protections afforded
detainees and civilians, their duty to care for the wounded and sick,
military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and collateral
damage1. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 3G).

(U) While at NTC, judge advocates from the Center for Law and Military
Operations (CLAMO) conducted impromptu interviews with the Soldiers,
including Soldiers from 1-69 IN, where they were questioned about
basic ROE principles. ROE is a key aspect of training at NTC and
Soldiers are challenged with difficult, real world scenarios that
emphasize ROE issues, such as, the use of force and properly
identifying hostile intent. (Annexes 111C, 1G).

(U) The Soldiers of the BP 541 team had received formal refresher ROE
training approximately one month before the incident. (Annexes 129C,
132C, 133C, 137C). This training included vignettes on TCP operations,
fixed site security, and patrols, and emphasized the use of graduated
force and how and when to use non-lethal measures of force.
Specifically, the vignettes highlighted how to discern hostile act and
hostile intent from innocuous civilian activity. (Annexes 111C, 1G).

(U) The entire battalion, including every member of the BP 541 team,
received an in-depth review of a recent AR 15-6 investigation
involving a shooting incident that further reinforced proper execution
of ROE. (Annex 133C). The investigation involved the wounding of a
civilian at a TCP, in which the vehicle was driving at a high rate of
speed and the Soldiers at the TCP engaged the vehicle. The brief
discussed the use of signs, chemical lights, spotlights, and graduated
force as it applies to fixed position operations. Failure to follow
the SOP was discussed and how proper use of the SOP can help a Soldier
to discern hostile intent. Escalation of force to discern hostile
intent was emphasized. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 2G, 3G).

(U) Furthermore, the Soldiers were briefed on ROE before going out on
patrol each day. They were so briefed on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 83C,
129C, 130C, 132C, 134C, 135C).

19 (S//NF) 1 Military necessity requires that all targets are proper
military targets, i.e., they possess a military attribute, the
destruction of which provides a military advantage. Proportionality
refers to whether any expected collateral damage is excessive in
comparison to the overall military value of the target. Discrimination
requires Soldiers to employ force in a manner that properly
distinguishes between lawful targets and unlawful targets. Collateral
damage encompasses any death or injury to civilians and damage or
destruction of civilian property.

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines a Hostile Act as "a use of
force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons or property under
the protection of 1-69 IN forces that is likely to cause serious
permanent injury or death or significant property damage." (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines Hostile Intent as "a threat of
imminent use of force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or persons
or property under the protection of MNC-I forces that is likely to
cause serious permanent injury or death or significant property
damage. Hostile intent may be judged by the threatening force or
individual's capability and preparedness to inflict damage, or by
evidence, particularly intelligence, that clearly indicates that a
surprise strike is imminent." (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE allows the use of deadly force if a
Soldier, his unit, other U.S. forces, or designated friendly forces
are attacked or threatened with imminent attack. (Annex 3F).

(S//NF) The ROE taught to the Soldiers was shout, show, shove, shoot.
(Annexes 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE also
provides for shout, show, shove, shoot. (Annex 3F). For the night of 4
March 2005 at BP 541, the Soldiers were told the ROE was: Shout, i.e.,
use the spotlight on an approaching vehicle as far in advance of the
Alert Line as possible; Show, i.e., use the green laser light, aimed
at the driver, at the Alert Line; Shove, i.e., fire warning shots; and
Shoot, i.e., disabling shots first, then, if necessary, shoot to kill.
(Annexes 77C, 81C).

F. (U) Findings

(U) The leaders and Soldiers understood their mission to block vehicle
access to Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005. They were
knowledgeable of the Rules of Engagement to be employed in that
mission. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C).

(U) The Soldiers at BP 541 had been trained, and routinely refreshed
on, the Rules of Engagement since their arrival in theater. (Annexes
77C, 81C, 111C).

(U) There is no written SOP or TTP in 3ID, 2/10 MTN, or 1-69 IN for
the execution of the blocking mission and establishing a blocking
position. (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F). The procedure was passed on from the
departing unit (4-5 ADA) to the incoming unit (1-69 IN) during the
Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, where leaders observed the
execution of the mission one week, and executed the mission the
following week under the supervision of the outgoing unit (Right
Seat/Left Side Ride). The only training received by 1-69 IN Soldiers
on blocking positions was that employed along Route Irish during
after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred during the Left Seat Right
Seat Ride process with 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It
is clear that these BPs were not established as TCPs.

(U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is
required for establishing a blocking position (e.g., different road
signs). (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).

(U) Requiring the gunner in a blocking position to operate the
hand-held spotlight as well as his crew-served weapon is an accepted
practice in 1-69 IN. (Annexes 72C, 74C).

G. (U) Recommendations

(U) Recommend that all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) review the
inherent differences between the blocking mission and any other
mission involving TCPs. Given the nature of the environment in Iraq,
recommend that blocking positions be addressed separately in unit
SOPs.

1? (S//NF) Soldiers and leaders must understand that in a BP, the goal
is to achieve standoff as far away and as quickly as possible, with no
vehicle passage.

(U) Recommend a comprehensive review of TCP and blocking position
procedures, to include risk assessment, required equipment,
considerations for site selection, and the establishment of clearly
visible warnings or indicators, both day and night, for Soldier and
civilian recognition. The Soldiers and leaders must look at the
position holistically, i.e., from the perspective of Iraqi drivers and
what they might see. Units must enforce a quality control program to
maintain established standards.

(U) As of this writing, MNC-I has already embarked on a comprehensive
analysis of Entry Control Points (ECPs), TCPs, and BPs.

1? (S//NF) This analysis will produce standard practices and
guidelines for the selection and establishment of ECPs, TCPs, and BPs.

(U) Recommend that permanent Coalition participation be included in
the Force Protection Working Group to solicit lessons learned from
other nations' experiences in operating ECPs, TCPs, and BPs in an
insurgency environment. (U) Recommend the development and publication
of a written SOP for Rhino Bus Runs.

Verbale Calipari - ATMOSPHERICS

II. ATMOSPHERICS

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines the local security situation as of 4 March
2005, known insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and
recent events occurring in the vicinity of Checkpoint 541. The
previous experience of the Soldiers manning the BP that night, their
parent unit, and their higher headquarters units in the Baghdad Area
of Responsibility (AOR), is also examined. The purpose of this section
is to present a full picture of the conditions facing the Soldiers
manning BP 541 that night.

B. (U) Local Security Situation

1. (U) Iraq. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were 15,257
attacks against Coalition Forces throughout Iraq. The U.S. considers
all of Iraq a combat zone. (Annex 8E).

2. (U) Baghdad. Baghdad is a city of six million people and is home to
a large number of suspected insurgents and terrorists operating both
in the city and its environs.

(S//NF) From 1 November 2004 to 12 March 2005 there were a total of
3306 attacks in the Baghdad area. Of these, 2400 were directed against
Coalition Forces. (Annex 8E)

3. (U) Route Irish. Route Irish is an East-West road along south
Baghdad. It is approximately 12 kilometers long and runs from the
International Zone in downtown Baghdad to BIAP. The highway is a
four-lane road with a 50 meter wide median. (Annexes 8E, 144K).

(U) Route Irish has six major intersections. Each of these has been
assigned a corresponding checkpoint number by Coalition Forces to
facilitate command and control. Entry Control Point 1 (ECP 1) is
located at one end of the highway near BIAP. Checkpoints 539-543
follow the road east going into downtown. (Annex 141K).

(U) Checkpoint 541 refers to the intersection of Route Irish with
Route Vernon (also known as Route Force), which runs North-South.
(Annex 142K).

(U) Route Irish is commonly referred to as "the deadliest road in
Iraq" by journalists, Soldiers, and commanders. There is no
corresponding alternative route from downtown Baghdad (and the
International Zone) to BIAP, which gives the route a heavy traffic
flow and causes Coalition convoy movement to become more predictable.
These conditions make Route Irish a lucrative target area for
insurgents to employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs) of varying
types and to achieve effects in terms of casualties. Soldiers in 1st
Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division have come to refer to Route
Irish as "IED Alley." (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) Between 1 November 2004 and 12 March 2005, there were 135
attacks or hostile incidents that occurred along Route Irish. These
included 9 complex attacks (i.e., a combination of more than one type
of attack, e.g., an IED followed by small arms fire or mortars), 19
explosive devices found, 3 hand grenades, 7 indirect fire attacks, 19
roadside explosions, 14 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 15 vehicle
borne explosive devices, and 4 other types of attacks. (Annexes 1E,
8E).

(S//NF) The attack density for the period 1 November 2004 to 12 March
2005 is 11.25 attacks per mile, or a minimum of one attack per day
along Route Irish since November. (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) The highest concentration of IED attacks occurs at 1000 hours,
with the second highest concentration of attacks occurring at 1600
hours. These times correspond to convoys departing from or arriving at
the Victory Base complex, the largest Coalition military facility in
Baghdad. (Annex 5E).

(S//NF) Approximately 66 percent of all night time attacks along Route
Irish occur between the hours of 1900 and 2100. (Annex 8E). The
incident at BP 541 occurred between 2030 and 2100 hours on 4 March
2005.

(U) The majority of IED and VBIED attacks occur in and around three
overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543) and the turnoff to the
International Zone. As mentioned earlier, CP 541 is the location where
the incident occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3E).

C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

1. (U) Methods of Attack

(U) Insurgent attacks throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall
into one of several categories, all of which have occurred along Route
Irish in the past year. They include:
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Unexploded IEDs, Hand Grenades,
Indirect Fire (mortars, rockets, and unidentified indirect fire),
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Small Arms Fire (SAF), Vehicle-Borne
Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), and Complex Attacks. The most
common attacks along Route Irish are IEDs, VBIEDs, and SAF. (Annex
8E).

2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs

(U) A large number of evolving techniques have been adopted by the
insurgents in placing IEDs along Route Irish. Examples of currently
used techniques are listed below:

1? (S//NF) Explosives positioned alongside guard rails. The large
number of guard rails on the road make these devices difficult to
detect and relatively easy to emplace by staging equipment in vehicles
or near overpasses, and, in a matter of minutes, having the IED armed
and in the desired location.

1? (S//NF) Explosives wrapped in a brown paper bag or a plastic trash
bag. This is a particularly easy method of concealment, easy to
emplace, and has been used effectively against Coalition Forces and
civilians along Route Irish.

2? (S//NF) Explosives set on a timer. This technique is new to the
Route Irish area, but is being seen more frequently.

3? (S//NF) Use of the median. The 50 meter wide median of Route Irish
provides a large area for emplacing IEDs. These can be dug in, hidden,
and/or placed in an animal carcass or other deceptive container.

4? (S//NF) Surface laid explosives. The enemy will drop a bag
containing the explosive onto the highway and exit the area on an
off-ramp with the detonation occurring seconds or minutes later
depending on the desired time for the explosion.

5? (S//NF) Explosives on opposite sides of the median. Devices have
been found along both sides of the median that were apparently
designed to work in tandem, to counter Coalition Force tactics to
avoid the right side of the highway while traveling Route Irish.

6? (S//NF) Explosives hidden under the asphalt. Insurgents pretend to
do work on the pavement, plant the explosives, and repair the surface.
These are usually remote-detonated devices.

(Annex 11E).

3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs
(U) There are two basic types of car bombs, i.e., suicide (where the
car is moving) and stationary (where the car is parked). Both can be
either command or remote-detonated. (Annex 8E).

(S//NF) The enemy is very skillful at inconspicuously packing large
amounts of explosives into a vehicle. The most commonly used
detonation materials are plastic explosives and 155mm artillery
shells. When moving, these VBIEDs are practically impossible to
identify until it is too late. (Annex 8E).

(U) The techniques for employing VBIEDs continue to evolve. Some of
the more commonly used techniques include:

(S//NF) Multiple suicide vehicles. The first vehicle either creates an opening
for a second, more powerful vehicle, or acts as bait to draw other personnel,
such as medics and other first responders, into the kill zone of the
first vehicle.

As people respond, the second VBIED engages the responders.

? (S//NF) Suicide VBIEDs are typically used against convoys, Coalition Force
patrols, or Coalition checkpoints where they can achieve maximum damage.
Such vehicles will rapidly approach the convoy from the rear and attempt to
get in between convoy vehicles before detonating.

? (S//NF) Stationary VBIEDs are typically parked along main supply routes,
like Route Irish, and often have been found near known checkpoints. These
are usually remotely operated and may be employed in conjunction with a
suicide VBIED.

? (S//NF) A particularly devious technique is for a driver to approach a
checkpoint and claim that he has injured people in his vehicle. The VBIED is
then detonated when Coalition Soldiers approach.
(Annex 8E).

4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks (U) The number of IED detonations from
15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 (the date of the incident), has
steadily increased. Although the effectiveness of those detonations
has decreased over that timeframe, the overall average number of
casualties during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex
4E).

(S//NF) The week of the incident saw 166 IED incidents, with 131
detonations and 35 IEDs rendered safe. There were 82 casualties from
those incidents. (Annex 4E). (U) The number of VBIED detonations from
15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 has also seen a relatively steady
increase. Similar to the decrease in the effectiveness of IEDs, the
effectiveness of VBIEDs has also decreased over that period, but there
have been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large
numbers of casualties. (Annex 4E).

(S//NF) There were 17 VBIEDs detonated during the week of the incident
with five rendered safe. The average casualty per VBIED detonation
that week was 23 due to the large number of casualties that resulted
from a VBIED detonation in Al Hillah. The Al Hillah attack was widely
publicized and caused all Coalition Forces concern as they patrolled
Baghdad and its environs. Any intelligence gained on potential VBIEDs
was passed in the form of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out) message to units
on patrol via FM radio. (Annex 4E).

D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541

(U) Overpasses like Checkpoint 541 are particularly susceptible to
attacks. Such sites provide excellent early observation in all
directions, easy escape routes, and high speed access to Route Irish.
The latter factor is particularly evident at Checkpoint 541 where
there is a long (380 meter) exit lane coming off of southbound Route
Vernon leading to the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 5E).

(S//NF) Checkpoint 541 has been the site of 13 attacks between 1
November 2004 and early March 2005. Two of those attacks involved
VBIEDs. Other attacks included mortars, small arms fire, and IEDs.
(Annex 1E). (U) On the evening of the incident, there were at least
two cases of small arms fire in the immediate vicinity, one before and
one after the incident. Also, as mentioned earlier, while the Joint
Investigation Team was examining the site, a hand grenade was tossed
at the personnel from the Route Vernon overpass. This site is under
the observation of insurgents in the adjoining housing complex and
local neighborhoods anytime a position is established at Checkpoint
541. (Annex 1E).

(S//NF) The two adjoining Route Irish checkpoints, numbers 540 and
542, were also the target of attacks during the 1 November 2004 to
early March 2005 period. Checkpoint 540 had 15 attacks, with three of
those attacks being VBIEDs. Similarly, Checkpoint 542 had 12 attacks
during that period, with two of those attacks being VBIEDs. (Annex
1E).

(U) Furthermore, two days before the incident, two Soldiers from the
same unit (1-69 IN) were killed by an IED at Checkpoint 543. The
Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN lost a very close friend in that attack.
(Annexes 1E, 74C).

E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility

1. (U) Third Infantry Division (3ID)

(U) The Division returned to Iraq in early February 2005. It
conducted a formal Transfer of Authority with the 1st Cavalry Division
and assumed responsibility for MND-Baghdad on 27 February 2005. (Annex
15E).

(S//NF) The Division consists of seven U.S. Brigades and one Iraqi
Brigade. Since their arrival, units of 3ID have conducted 14,463
patrols throughout the Baghdad area, to include 33 Rhino Bus escort
missions (See Section III.C.5. of this report for background
information on the Rhino Bus), through 25 March 2005. (Annex 15E).

(S//NF) In its first month since TOA, 3ID has received 422 attacks
from insurgents resulting in 13 killed and 60 wounded. (Annex 15E).
2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN)

(U) The Second Brigade has been in Iraq for nearly eight months. (Annex 65C).

(U) From 12 August 2004 to 11 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers conducted
approximately 50,000 patrols. The Soldiers also conducted 5,237
Traffic Control Points (TCPs) during that period. (Annex 4E).

(U) Between 15 December 2004 and 13 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers
conducted 712 TCPs in support of Rhino Bus operations. There were
usually eight such TCPs conducted per night in support of Rhino Bus
movements. (Annex 4E).

(U) The "TCPs" that were conducted for the Rhino Bus movements are
more properly called hasty Blocking Positions (BPs). (See Section
III.B. of this report for a discussion of the difference between TCPs
and BPs).

3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion (1-69 IN)

(U) 1-69 IN arrived in the Iraqi Theater of Operations on 4 November
2004. The unit first served in Taji, north of Baghdad where they spent
approximately three months. While in Taji, the primary mission of 1-69
IN was to conduct patrols in search of insurgents responsible for
firing rockets and mortars at Coalition bases. (Annex 10E).

(U) In February 2005, 1-69 IN relocated to Baghdad under the command
and control of 2/10 MTN. The Commander, 1st Cavalry Division assigned
the unit the mission of patrolling and securing Route Irish as of 15
February 2005. (Annex 65C).

(U) Through early April 2005, 1-69 IN had conducted over 2000 patrols
in Iraq. About two-thirds of those patrols were dismounted patrols
requiring the Soldiers to leave their vehicles. About one-third of the
patrols were conducted at night. (Annex 10E).

(U) The unit has conducted over 1000 Traffic Control Points (TCPs)
since arriving in Iraq. Most of those occurred along Route Irish.
Other than the subject incident, there was only one incident involving
civilians (one wounded civilian in Taji). (Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Since arriving in Iraq, 1-69 IN has experienced 19 roadside
explosive devices, 38 incidents of small arms fire, 4 RPGs, 3 VBIEDs,
3 hand grenades, 16 indirect fire attacks, and 2 complex attacks.
(Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Five attacks against 1-69 IN in November resulted in two
fatalities and three wounded. Five detonations in December resulted in
one fatality and three wounded. In January 2005, 1-69 IN received six
detonations that resulted in seven fatalities and three wounded. The
seven fatalities all came in one attack involving 10 buried 155mm
artillery rounds. After relocating to Baghdad in February, the unit
received one attackwith no fatalities or wounded. Through early March,
1-69 IN has received four detonations resulting in three fatalities
and three wounded. (Annex 10E).

(S//NF) Overall, 1-69 IN suffered 10 fatalities and 9 wounded while in
Taji, followed by 3 fatalities and 3 wounded while conducting security
operations on Route Irish. All 13 of the unit's combat related
fatalities in theater have come as a result of IEDs. (Annex 10E).

4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion (1-76 FA)

(U) 1-76 FA was new to the Baghdad AOR, having arrived on 21 February
2005. Their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program began on 22 February
2005. 1-76 FA personnel were in the last night of their Right
Seat/Left Seat Ride program with 2-82 FA and in charge of VIP security
operations on the evening of 4 March 2005. The Transfer of Authority
occurred the next day, 5 March 2005. (Annexes 59C, 63C).

(U) 1-76 FA is responsible for security inside the International Zone
as well as U.S. Embassy VIP movement security along Route Irish.
(Annex 58C). (U) 1-76 FA has Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) to
coordinate directly with 1-69 IN for security along Route Irish. This
is the same level of coordination previously authorized by 1st Cavalry
Division to 2-82 FA. When executing DIRLAUTH, 1-76 FA directly
coordinates an action with units internal or external to its command
and keeps the 3ID commander informed. The 1-76 FA TOC passes all
coordination efforts through the 4th Brigade TOC to 3ID JOC. (Annex
58C).

F. (U) Findings

(U) Route Irish and its checkpoints, particularly the ones at the
three overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543), are continually subject
to attacks from IEDs, VBIEDs, SAF, and other methods of attack. It is
a road filled with dangers that can kill, maim, and injure Soldiers
and civilians. (Annexes 3E, 5E, 8E).

(U) The insurgents are continually adjusting their methods of attack
along the Route Irish corridor. (Annex 11E).

(U) The long straightaway off southbound Route Vernon leading to the
on-ramp to westbound Route Irish provides an excellent opportunity for
a suicide VBIED to build up speed and threaten Soldiers in their
positions. (Annex 5E).

(U) The Soldiers of 1-69 IN had suffered a significant number of
deaths in the four months that they had been in Iraq as of 4 March
2005, including two Soldiers that were killed by an IED at Checkpoint
543 two days before the incident. (Annexes 1E, 10E).

(U) 1-69 IN Soldiers were experienced in patrolling, providing route
security, and conducting TCPs. (Annex 10E). (U) Due to it being their
first full day on shift, 1-76 FA Soldiers lacked experience in issuing
operational orders and in battle tracking security forces during
execution of blocking missions. (Annexes 59C, 63C).